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 ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT MANAGEMENT: 
NETWORKS, STRATEGIC REFINANCING, AND REGULATORY DISCLOSURE 
By 
KOMLA D. DZIGBEDE 
AUGUST 2016 
Committee Chair: Dr. W. Bartley Hildreth 
Major Department: Public Management and Policy 
This three-essay dissertation attempts to fill research gaps in three streams of 
literature on municipal debt management. The first essay focuses on stability of debt 
management networks. Debt network stability is the extent to which municipal issuers 
repeatedly use the same financial intermediaries to issue new bonds. The essay examines 
whether network stability lowers subnational governments’ new issue borrowing costs in 
primary markets for municipal bonds. The analytical design combines social network 
theory and cross-sectional modeling and centers on state debt management networks in 
California. Findings show that after a critical threshold of repeat issuer-intermediary 
interactions is attained, municipal borrowing costs tend to decrease as networks become 
more stable.   
The second essay analyzes strategic refinancing decisions in primary markets for 
municipal bonds. It focuses on school district debt refinancing transactions and quantifies 
the opportunity costs, or option value loss, associated with the timing of transactions. The 
essay uses Monte Carlo simulation and financial option-pricing techniques to analyze a 
random sample of Texas school district bonds. Findings show that school districts’ 
refinancing transactions resulted in option value loss equivalent to millions of dollars.   
In the third essay, I investigate the extent to which regulatory interventions in 
municipal bond secondary markets reduce inefficiencies in municipal securities pricing. 
In particular, I analyze the trade price impacts of the 2008 implementation of new 
disclosure interventions. I apply time series regressions, with robustness checks, to a 
large dataset of trades in California’s general obligation bonds. Results show that the 
interventions reduced pricing inefficiencies in secondary markets as a whole; however, 
big (or institutional) investors continue to have a marginal price advantage over small (or 
retail) investors in securities trading.  
The three essays shed more light on debt management in primary and secondary 
markets for municipal bonds. They cover some of the frontier research topics on debt 
issuance, refinancing, and trading. The essays provide a way to gauge the efficient level 
of interdependence in debt management networks, present an empirical framework for 
evaluating the timing of school district debt refinancing transactions, and offer insights 
that should guide regulatory policy discussions on fair pricing of debt securities.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Municipal bond markets serve a crucial need for subnational governments seeking 
to raise capital for long-term projects. Borrowing long-term enables states, counties, 
cities, school districts, and special districts to realize immediate benefits from their 
investments, instead of postponing benefits for many years until annual income streams 
accumulate enough capital to fund projects.  
In the United States, municipal borrowings have grown significantly over the 
years. State and local governments’ outstanding debt obligations totaled $3.7 trillion in 
2014 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015). Between 1945 and 1981, the size of 
the municipal bond market grew by $488 billion, and from 1982 to 2014, market size 
expanded by $3.2 trillion (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, 2015). 
New debt issues have historically accounted for the larger proportion of total debt 
obligations (on average, 60 percent during the past two decades) but in recent years 
refinancing (or refunding) issues have gained importance and outpaced new capital. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates trends in outstanding debt obligations of state and local 
governments and Figure 1.2 traces the patterns in new and refunding debt issues.    
Along with its growth in size, the municipal debt market has become more 
sophisticated in the types of debt instruments available to investors. Compared to earlier 
decades where simpler instruments (e.g., fixed rate general obligation bonds) dominated 
the market, new debt instruments (e.g., variable-rate obligations, derivative securities, 
tax-exempt inverse floaters, and interest rate swaps) now offer more flexibility to issuers 
(Hildreth & Zorn, 2005) but make municipal debt management more complicated. 
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Figure 1.1. Outstanding Debt Obligations of State and Local Governments. Displayed in 
Billion U.S. Dollars. Data is from Securities and Exchange Commission (2015) and 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2015). 
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Figure 1.2. State and Local Government New and Refunding Debt Issues. Displayed in 
Billion U.S. Dollars. Data sources are Securities and Exchange Commission (2015) and 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2015).  
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
Subnational government transactions in municipal debt markets have faced 
increased public scrutiny in recent decades as markets have become larger and more 
sophisticated. Citizens deserve to know whether state and local governments make 
efficient use of public funds in municipal debt transactions. Additionally, municipal debt 
market regulators have a responsibility to ensure that market practices are transparent and 
trade prices are efficient.   
Within these contexts, municipal finance scholars have tried to expand knowledge 
on the most efficient ways to manage debt issuance and trading. Despite active 
scholarship in state and local government debt management, areas of research remain to 
be examined in more detail. This dissertation attempts to fill gaps in the municipal 
finance literature by investigating three interconnected themes.  
The first theme concerns networks in state and local government debt issuance. It 
analyzes how stability of debt networks, defined as the extent to which issuers repeatedly 
use the same financial intermediaries to issue new bonds, affect municipal borrowing 
costs in primary markets. Existing research on network stability and borrowing costs 
either lack formal empirical models for testing the stability-borrowing cost relationship, 
or present analytical framework that do not fully capture the dynamic market 
environments within which debt management networks form and function. The 
dissertation tests an analytical model that combines social network theory and cross-
sectional regressions to deepen understanding of the impact of debt network stability on 
municipal borrowing costs.  
The second theme relates to strategic refinancing decisions in municipal bond 
primary markets. Prior research pays little attention to the opportunity costs, or option 
5 
 
value loss, associated with the timing of municipal bond refinancing transactions; even 
the few studies within this research stream use estimation procedures and simplifying 
assumptions that do not fully account for the option value loss associated with the timing 
of transactions. This dissertation focuses on school districts, given the absence of detailed 
attention to their refinancing transactions in the academic literature. It uses Monte Carlo 
simulation and financial option-pricing procedures to analyze the option value loss 
associated with a more sophisticated form of debt refinancing called advance refunding.1  
The third theme focuses on pricing of trades in secondary markets for municipal 
securities. Over the years, regulatory disclosure interventions in secondary markets have 
spurred a growing body of research on the impacts of interventions on securities trade 
pricing. However, existing studies do not provide a full picture of regulatory 
effectiveness – some studies do not extend to more recent interventions, and those that do 
either ignore the influence of market-wide factors on trade prices or find weak evidence 
to explain the differences in trade pricing that tend to exist between individual and 
institutional investor groups. This dissertation investigates the latest wave of regulatory 
interventions, which spanned March 31, 2008 and June 1, 2009. It uses time series 
regressions to test whether the interventions enhanced price efficiency in municipal 
securities secondary markets. Additionally, the dissertation investigates whether the 
interventions affected investor groups differently – in particular, it explores the difference 
in trade price impacts, if any, between institutional and retail investors.  
The three themes are interconnected: debt issuance occurs in primary markets, 
where state and local governments raise funds to undertake capital projects that provide 
                                                          
1 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation of an advance refunding debt transaction and the 
measurement of option value loss.   
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long-term benefits for citizens; debt refinancing occurs sometime after state and local 
governments’ initial issuance, when prevailing market conditions make it feasible for 
governments to exercise the call option on outstanding bonds prior to debt maturity and 
reap interest cost savings; and issuer-specific, bond-related, and primary market 
conditions affect pricing of debt securities in secondary markets, where retail and 
institutional investors trade.  
All three streams of literature derive from efficiency motivations – those of state 
and local governments seeking to minimize the cost of debt issuance and maximize 
savings from refinancing, and of market regulators introducing reforms to enhance 
efficient pricing of municipal securities trades. The next sections of this chapter describe 
the general structure of the markets within which debt issuance, bond refinancing, and 
securities trading all take place, and present the road map for analyses in this dissertation.   
 
1.1 Structure and Function of U.S. Municipal Bond Markets 
U.S. municipal bond markets consist of two sub-markets – the primary market 
and the secondary market. The primary market is where state and local governments issue 
debt to raise capital for long-term projects. In the secondary market, broker dealers sell 
the original debt securities to institutional and retail investors and facilitate buying and 
re-selling of securities among investors (Government Accountability Office, 2012). The 
municipal bond market consists of a large number of participants from the public and 
private sectors. Participants from the public sector include states, counties, cities, and 
school districts, and private sector participants consist of underwriters, municipal (or 
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financial) advisors, bond lawyers, retail investors, institutional investors, and insurance 
companies, among others.  
Municipal bond markets attain a level of equilibrium as market mechanisms steer 
the divergent economic goals of market agents towards the common goal of market 
efficiency. Hildreth (1993) identified the critical role underwriters play in steering issuer 
goals and investor expectations toward equilibrium in municipal bond markets. He 
explained how state and local governments seek the lowest cost of capital over a desired 
repayment schedule, while investors desire the highest rate of return on the capital they 
loan as well as repayment of their principal upon maturity; within this setting, 
underwriters work to steer issuer goals and investor expectations towards market 
equilibrium and obtain a risk premium in return for their services. Other studies, such as 
Leland and Pyle (1977), Millon and Thakor (1985), and Peng and Brucato Jr. (2004), 
highlight the roles of bond lawyers, municipal advisors, and credit rating agencies in 
facilitating the transfer of information among issuers and investors to resolve information 
asymmetry and enhance market efficiency.   
 
1.2 State and Local Government Debt Issuance in Primary Markets 
Municipal debt issuance is a complex process that embraces public and private 
sector actors and spans different stages, such as timing of the debt issuance, designing 
features of the bond issue, and securing specialized services from municipal advisors, 
bond lawyers, and underwriters, for the sale of bonds (Simonsen & Hill, 1998). Method 
of sale is a major consideration in municipal debt issuance. The academic literature 
identifies two main methods of sale, namely competitive bidding and negotiated sales 
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(Simonsen & Hill, 1998; Fruits, Booth, Pozdena, & Smith, 2008). Competitive bidding is 
where many underwriters bid for sale of a debt issue and the issuer awards sale of the 
issue to the bidder offering the lowest interest cost of issuance. In negotiated sales, the 
issuer directly selects an underwriter and negotiates interest costs of issuance and other 
terms with the underwriter.  
Institutional rules, statutes, and limits govern debt issuance across U.S. states. 
These institutional mechanisms aim at achieving efficient use of public funds in debt 
transactions. They also seek to hold public managers accountable to local citizens. 
Poterba and Rueben (2001), Lowery and Alt (2001), Johnson and Kriz (2005), Ter-
Minassian (2007), and Dove (2014) are among the authors that discuss various legal and 
fiscal constraints characterizing the municipal bond issuance process. Despite the 
existence of legal and fiscal constraints, state and local government debt issuance has, in 
a few instances, been plagued by financial malfeasance arising from perverse networks of 
issuers and financial intermediaries.2  
Refinancing of debt occurs in primary markets. After an initial issuance, 
prevailing market conditions may make it feasible for an issuer to exercise the call 
provision in their original debt issue and replace the original debt with new debt at a 
lower interest cost. The refinancing strategy may generate millions of dollars in interest 
costs savings for the municipality. However, in complicated forms of refinancing such as 
advance refunding, where an issuer can engage in refinancing before the call date in the 
                                                          
2 For example, in 2009, Bloomberg News reported an alleged case of impropriety in the choice of an 
underwriter for a new debt issue by Palm Beach County, Florida. According to the report, the County 
Commissioner allegedly helped steer public underwriting business to underwriting firms that employed her 
spouse. - See Bloomberg News, “Palm Beach Scandal Helps Bids After Official Negotiated Favors,” 
March 10, 2009. 
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original bond, timing of transactions becomes a critical factor in ensuring efficiency of 
debt management.  
 
1.3 Trading of Municipal Securities in Secondary Markets 
Secondary markets are the domain for municipal bond trades. Trading takes place 
between market dealers and investors and among market dealers.3 Dealers buy securities 
from investors seeking to sell rather than hold securities to maturity; dealers resell the 
securities to another investor or sell back to the market, and charge a premium for 
facilitating the market exchange.4  
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (2014b) identified key 
characteristics of secondary market trading in U.S. municipal bond markets. The report 
indicated that about one-half of trades in the market had a trade size below $25,000 and 
traded 10 or fewer times. This indicates a substantial amount of retail investor activity 
and lack of liquidity in the market. Figure 1.3 traces the number and par value (or 
principal amount) of trades occurring each month in recent years, and Figure 1.4 shows 
the distribution of total yearly trades categorized according to trade size. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 describes a dealer as a person or firm engaged in facilitating 
securities transactions for the account of that person or firm. 
4 See the MSRB’s overview of trading in secondary markets at the following internet link: 
http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/How-the-Market-Works/Secondary-Market-Trading.aspx 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Trading of Municipal Debt Securities. Compiled from Securities and 
Exchange Commission (2015) and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(2015) data. 
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Figure 1.4. Distribution of Trades According to Size of Trade. Compiled using data from 
Securities and Exchange Commission (2015) and Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (2015). 
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1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
This chapter provides a broad overview of the structure of U.S. municipal bond 
markets and explains some core considerations in municipal bond issuance and trading. 
Remaining chapters provide more detail on the three streams of literature discussed above 
and present research questions arising from those streams. Chapter 2 analyzes the 
relationship between network stability and borrowing costs in municipal debt issuance, 
Chapter 3 investigates the option value effects of school district bond refinancing 
decisions, and Chapter 4 examines the impacts of regulatory disclosure interventions on 
price behavior in municipal securities secondary markets.   
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CHAPTER 2 
NETWORKS AND BORROWING COSTS IN MUNICIPAL DEBT ISSUANCE 
 
2.1 Background and Research Questions 
Debt management networks may be defined as interactions among state and local 
government debt issuers and the financial intermediaries involved in debt issuance 
(Marlowe, 2013). Networks may involve repeat interactions and long-term relationships 
among network members in municipal debt markets (Li & Schürhoff, 2012). Figure 2.1 
illustrates a debt management network existing among a municipal debt issuer and three 
financial intermediaries – a municipal or financial advisor, bond lawyer, and underwriter.  
Underwriters work with municipal issuers to structure the bond sale (Simonsen & 
Hill, 1998; Fruits, Booth, Pozdena, & Smith, 2008).5 Municipal advisors give issuers 
financial advice on debt issuance, investment of issuance proceeds, and use of 
derivatives, among others (Luby & Hildreth, 2014), and bond lawyers give informed 
opinions on the legal status of municipal securities, assuring investors that the securities 
are binding legal obligations of the issuer (Johnson, Luby, & Moldogaziev, 2014).    
 Municipal finance researchers have used social network theory to explain the 
impacts of networks on state and local government debt management outcomes. Social 
network theory combines insights from the management (inter-organizational theory) and 
behavioral (small group theory) sciences and examines the roles of social actors and the 
ties that bind different actors together (Scott, 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
                                                          
5 Most bonds are structured as part of a serial issuance, with multiple CUSIPs per issuance (The Bond 
Market Association, 2001). A CUSIP is an alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each maturity of a 
debt issue (MSRB, 2014a). 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Illustration of a Debt Management Network. 
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Different actors may come together in a social network and work towards a common goal 
that yields economic or social benefits for all members (Worley & Mirvis, 2013). 
However, the extent to which the social network achieves its goals may depend on the 
structural properties of the network (Aral & Alstyne, 2007). 
In the municipal finance literature, emphasis on the structural properties of 
networks has been motivated, in part, by cases of impropriety and collusion between 
subnational issuers and financial intermediaries involved in debt issuance. Hildreth and 
Zorn (2005 ) examined recent defaults and/or debt management problems involving 
school districts (e.g., California’s Richmond Unified School District in 1991), cities (e.g., 
Cleveland in 1978), counties (e.g., Orange County in 1994) and states (e.g., Louisiana in 
1988, Connecticut in 1991, and California in 2001) and highlighted how, in some 
instances, improper and unethical practices saddled the bond issuance process. Such 
cases deepen research interest in the structural properties of issuer-intermediary networks 
and the level of interdependence within networks that will ensure more efficient debt 
management outcomes for state and local governments. 
Municipal finance scholars have drawn from social network theory to explore 
how specific properties of debt networks, such as stability, affect debt management 
outcomes such as borrowing costs. Debt network stability is the extent to which a 
municipal issuer repeatedly uses the same financial intermediaries in new debt issuance 
(Marlowe, 2013). The concept of stability implies permanence of membership of the 
network as well as redundancy of members' ties with others both inside and outside of the 
network (Aldrich & Whetton, 1981).  
16 
 
Miller and Justice (2012) examined stability of the network between issuers and 
intermediaries involved in municipal debt issuance. They highlighted how network 
stability affects municipal borrowing costs through channels of risk-taking, learning, 
innovation, and adaptation. On the one hand, more stable networks generate greater 
opportunities for learning, than less stable networks do, and greater opportunities lead 
network members to innovate and adapt to new strategies that make errors less likely and 
outcomes more beneficial. On the other hand, more stable networks have a greater 
likelihood to yield to the imposition of one member’s narrow views on what strategies the 
network should pursue, resulting in more errors in strategy, greater risk-taking, and less 
beneficial outcomes. 
Direct empirical tests of the impacts of network stability on borrowing outcomes 
is lacking in the academic literature. Miller (1993), Miller (1996), and Miller and Justice 
(2012) examined network stability effects on municipal borrowing costs but did not test a 
formal empirical model; nevertheless, Miller and Justice (2012) outlined a set of 
propositions to guide future studies. Also, empirical tests of network effects on borrowing 
costs have focused on network centrality, rather than network stability, leaving a gap in 
understanding of how network stability directly impacts state and local government 
borrowing costs.6 
In the present study, I extend existing knowledge on debt management networks 
by designing and testing an empirical model that links network stability to municipal 
borrowing costs. I examine whether higher levels of network stability are associated with 
lower municipal borrowing costs. I apply cross-sectional regression analysis to a 
                                                          
6 Network centrality refers to a financial intermediary’s place among issuers in the municipal bond market 
(Marlowe, 2013).  
17 
 
comprehensive dataset on new debt issues in California, and focus on the period starting 
from 2005 to 2014. I ask the following research question: What is the relationship 
between network stability and subnational governments’ new issue borrowing costs in 
municipal debt markets?  
In the next sections of this chapter, I examine the academic literature further to 
develop hypotheses. I also outline the study methodology, discuss data and variable 
formulations, present estimation results, and provide policy implications and directions 
for future research.   
 
2.2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
In this review of the academic literature, I examine the stream of literature that 
links debt management networks with municipal borrowing costs. I also discuss other 
determinants of borrowing costs, including method of debt issuance, which is a major 
theme in studies of state and local government borrowing costs. I outline hypotheses 
based on the literature review.   
 
2.2.1 Studies of Debt Networks and Borrowing Costs  
As noted earlier, municipal finance research has focused on two structural 
properties of debt management networks. Some studies have explored, without formally 
testing, the impacts of network stability on municipal borrowing costs in primary markets 
(e.g., Miller & Justice, 2012) while other studies have formally tested the impacts of 
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network centrality on borrowing costs in primary markets (e.g., Marlowe, 2013) as well 
as its impacts on trading costs in secondary markets (e.g., Li & Schürhoff, 2012).7 
With regard to network stability, scholars have not directly tested its impacts on 
debt management outcomes such as borrowing costs. Miller and Justice (2012) used 
outcomes from a simulation exercise involving goal-oriented graduate students to 
develop two propositions on the borrowing cost effects of network stability. They 
focused on how resource-based and incentive-related differences among team members 
affected stability of the team and how, in turn, team stability affected team performance.  
The first proposition suggests a negative relationship between network stability 
and debt management outcomes such as borrowing costs. More stable networks of issuers 
and financial intermediaries produce greater learning opportunities among network 
members than is the case for less stable networks, and greater opportunities for learning 
lead to innovation and adaptation to new strategies among network members, which 
yields more beneficial outcomes, including lower municipal borrowing costs.  
In contrast, the second proposition defines a positive relationship between 
network stability and outcomes such as borrowing costs. As stability of networks 
increases, members are more likely to yield to the imposition of one member’s narrow 
views on the most efficient strategy the network should pursue. Potential domination of 
network strategy by a single member as network stability increases, raises the probability 
                                                          
7 Marlowe’s (2013) study of network centrality in primary markets examined how a financial 
intermediary’s place among issuers in the market affects interest costs on new issue municipal bonds. He 
found that borrowing costs are lower when more central players are involved in municipal bond sales. 
Similarly, Li and Schürhoff (2012) analyzed how centrality of a dealer within a network of dealers affects 
the dealer’s trading costs. Among other findings, the authors showed that central dealers charge 
considerably larger mark-up prices than dealers at the periphery of the trading network, and as centrality of 
the dealers intermediating in trade increases, informational efficiency of trade prices also increases. These 
findings on network centrality give insights on the scope of analytical work on debt management networks, 
even though the main point of focus in the present study is network stability.  
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of the network making more errors in strategy, undertaking greater risks, and reaping less 
beneficial outcomes such as higher issuer borrowing costs.   
The academic literature is not unanimous on whether debt network stability 
should have a positive or negative impact on issuers’ borrowing costs. Nevertheless, I 
hypothesize a negative relationship between network stability and municipal borrowing 
costs, based on the first proposition in Miller and Justice (2012) described above. 
Specifically, I test the following hypothesis:  
H2.1 State and local governments’ borrowing costs decrease as debt management 
networks they belong to become more stable.  
 
2.2.2 Studies Linking Method of Debt Issuance to Borrowing Costs 
Studies of the relationship between method of sale and borrowing costs are set in 
the theory of market efficiency. According to Fama (1970), market efficiency exists when 
prices in a market fully reflect available information. He noted that such prices provide 
accurate signals for resource allocation such that firms can make production-investment 
decisions and investors can choose among investment alternatives, all under conditions of 
zero transactions costs and costless information acquisition and processing. Similarly, 
Jensen (1978) and Jarrow and Larsson (2012 ) explained market efficiency within the 
context of zero economic profits by noting that efficiency exists if it is impossible for 
some market participants to make economic profits by trading on the basis of market 
information sets available to those participants.  
Furthermore, Akerlof (1970) discussed the implications of market inefficiency 
and asymmetric information. He hypothesized that under conditions of asymmetric 
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information, sellers possess more information than buyers and because good and bad 
products have the same market price, buyers cannot tell the difference between the 
products, and eventually, the sequence of bad products driving out good products could 
lead to market collapse. Akerlof’s diagnoses of uneven concentrations of power, 
uncertainty, and inefficient pricing aptly describe conditions in municipal bond markets.  
Drawing from finance theories on market efficiency, public administration 
scholars have analyzed the extent to which a chosen method of debt issuance mitigates 
information asymmetry and generates interest cost savings for the municipality. Most 
studies find that competitive bidding yields lower borrowing costs (e.g., Bland, 1985; 
Simonsen & Robbins, 1996; Guzman & Moldogaziev, 2012) while a small number of 
studies show that negotiated sales have similar (e.g., Stevens & Wood, 1998) or lower 
(e.g., Kriz, 2003) borrowing costs.8  
Competitive bidding leads to lower borrowing costs because the method involves 
the release of more information about an issuer and the debt issue than in negotiated 
sales; therefore, information asymmetry problems in competitive sales are fewer, 
transaction costs are smaller, and borrowing costs are lower. Peng and Brucato Jr. (2004), 
for example, examined information asymmetry in municipal bond issuance and found 
that market and institutional mechanisms, such as issuance by competitive rather than 
negotiated methods, helped to ease information asymmetry in the municipal bond market, 
                                                          
8 Despite the overwhelming empirical evidence that competitive sales are associated with lower borrowing 
costs, a larger proportion of state and local government debt issuers prefer negotiated sales to competitive 
sales. For example, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2015) data showed that, on 
average, negotiated sales accounted for 78.5 percent of all municipal bond sales from 1996 to 2011. On this 
subject, Hackbart and Denison (2014) highlighted factors other than interest costs that could determine 
whether an issuer uses the competitive or negotiated sale method. These factors include complexity of the 
transaction, market conditions, whether the bond is backed by a new revenue source, and whether the issuer 
has been active in the bond market previously.  
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thereby reducing issuers’ borrowing costs. Based on the above explanations, I test the 
following hypothesis on the relationship between method of debt issuance and municipal 
borrowing costs:   
H2.2: Issuers that sell debt by competitive bidding face lower borrowing costs 
than those that utilize the negotiated sale method of debt issuance.  
                                                                                              
2.2.3 Review of Other Determinants of Borrowing Costs    
Besides network stability and method of debt issuance, the academic literature 
discusses bond-specific, issuer-related, and market condition variables that affect 
municipal borrowing costs. I focus on three of these variables, namely size of an issue, 
credit rating of an issue, and market-wide conditions, and present hypotheses for testing 
their impacts on municipal borrowing costs.  
 
2.2.3.1 Size of a debt issue 
Larger debt issues are more likely to incur lower transaction costs than smaller 
debt issues because issuers of larger issues often employ the services of large financial 
intermediaries who typically operate at marginally lower transaction costs than small 
intermediaries, therefore larger debt issues have lower borrowing costs than smaller debt 
issues (Marlowe, 2011). Also, issuers often sell larger issues in national markets, where 
information asymmetry problems are limited, resulting in smaller transaction costs and 
lower borrowing costs; on the other hand, it is common for local investors to absorb 
smaller issues in local and regional markets where information asymmetry issues could 
raise transaction costs and lead to higher borrowing costs (Bland, 1985; Peng & Brucato 
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Jr., 2004). Additionally, local investors may know more about the smaller debt issue in 
local and regional markets than the information the issuer makes available market-wide; 
thus, rational investors will view this information mismatch as disadvantageous to them 
and the information asymmetry surrounding the smaller issue will result in higher interest 
costs for the issuer compared to a larger issue (Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004). Consequently, 
I test the following hypothesis:  
H2.3: Size of a debt issue is negatively associated with municipal borrowing 
costs.  
  
2.2.3.2 Credit rating of an issue 
Credit rating of a debt issue contains information that signals the issuer’s credit 
worthiness in respect of the specific debt obligation (Standard and Poor’s, 2015). The 
rating serves to mitigate information asymmetry about the debt issue. As such, issues 
with higher credit ratings face smaller transaction costs, hence lower borrowing costs, 
than issues with lower credit ratings (Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004; Boot, Milbourn, & 
Schmeits, 2006; Daniels & Ejara, 2009). I test the following hypothesis based on findings 
in existing studies:   
H2.4: Debt issues with higher credit ratings face lower borrowing costs than 
issues with lower credit ratings.  
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2.2.3.3 Market-wide conditions  
Municipal bond market conditions determine the type of environment within 
which state and local governments issue debt, the risks and uncertainties associated with 
their operations, and the interest cost savings they can achieve. Worsening municipal 
market conditions, which reflect in widening yield spreads, raise transaction costs in debt 
markets and increase borrowing costs significantly (Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004; 
Moldogaziev, 2012). Thus, I test the following hypothesis: 
H2.5: State and local governments’ borrowing costs increase as municipal 
market-wide conditions worsen.  
 
2.2.3.4 Other Bond-specific factors  
Other determinants of municipal borrowing costs include term to maturity of the 
bond (Marlowe, 2011), type of bond (Daniels & Ejara, 2009), purpose of the bond (Peng 
& Brucato Jr., 2004), whether the bond is insured (Moldogaziev, 2012; Peng & Brucato 
Jr., 2004), and whether it has a call provision (Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004). Investors tend 
to associate a longer term to maturity with higher probability of default and interest rate 
risk, therefore borrowing costs tend to rise as term to maturity increases (Marlowe 2009).  
Also, market agents view revenue bond types as more risky investments than 
general obligation bond types due to the less certain nature of the income stream backing 
revenue bonds – general obligation bonds are supported by the full faith and taxing power 
of the municipal borrower, while revenue bonds are supported by the income streams 
from the projects they finance; therefore, issuers are more likely to incur higher 
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borrowing costs with revenue bonds than general obligation bonds (Daniels & Ejara, 
2009).  
Furthermore, market agents consider municipal borrowing for the purpose of 
financing health care and economic development projects to be more risky than 
borrowing for education, utility, and government general purpose projects, therefore 
issuers will incur higher borrowing costs for health care and economic development 
projects than for purposes that agents perceive to be less risky (Leonard, 1983). Finally, 
Peng and Brucato Jr. (2004) showed that an issue’s call provision and insurance status are 
certification mechanisms that serve to mitigate information asymmetry concerns about 
the issue and limit investor uncertainty about the investment, therefore issues that have 
call provisions and insurance will be associated with lower municipal borrowing costs.   
 
2.3 Data and Variables 
I created a sample of municipal bonds, or CUSIPs, using data on California.9 I 
focus on California for two reasons. The State makes available, and from a single source, 
data on true interest costs of bonds as well as specific information on the financial 
intermediaries involved with issuing each bond. This information is available from the 
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC). The CDIAC datasets 
list the underwriter, municipal advisor, bond lawyer, and guarantor involved with each 
bond, in addition to bond-specific and issuer-related details. Finding detailed data on true 
                                                          
9 Most of the bonds in the sample are part of a serial issuance, with multiple CUSIPs per issuance. For 
example, the State of California made six new general obligation debt issues in 2014; the issues amounted 
to 116 CUSIPs altogether – on average, 19 CUSIPs per issuance (California Debt and Investment Advisory 
Commission, 2015). In analyses of state and local government debt, academic researchers (e.g., Ang, et al., 
2013; Cestau, Green, & Schurhoff, 2013; Harris & Piwowar, 2006) use CUSIPs as the ‘bond’ issue and not 
the complete serial sale. The present study uses a similar approach.  
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interest costs and financial intermediaries from a single source such as the CDIAC makes 
it convenient to analyze issuer-intermediary networks and impacts on borrowing costs.  
Additionally, California is the leading source of municipal debt issues among U.S. 
states. In 2013, for example, the state accounted for 14.2 percent of all outstanding state 
and local government debt obligations in the Unites States, higher than New York (11.7  
percent) and Texas (9.0 per cent), the second and third leading sources, respectively   
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). Figure 2.2 displays the share of each state’s debt in total 
outstanding municipal debt of all U.S. states, and Table 2.1 shows the total amount of 
state and local government debt outstanding for each U.S. state.  
Thus, California is a large source of information on municipal debt issuance 
patterns. However, this study is cautious about making generalizations to nation-wide 
contexts using the California dataset alone. Nevertheless, as descriptive statistics in 
Section 2.5.1 show, the California sample exhibits substantial variability similar to what 
exists in the population of U.S. municipal debt issues.  
I focus on state-issued fixed rate general obligation bonds with maturities greater 
than 3 years. Marlowe (2009) noted how municipal bonds that have variable rates and 
maturities less than 3 years sell in markets other than primary markets thereby 
complicating analyses if they are included in a sample for estimation. Also, I focus my 
analysis on networks between the state government debt issuer and underwriters. 
Networks between underwriters and other subnational governments, such as school 
districts, cities, and counties, are beyond the scope of this study, as are the more intricate 
issuer-underwriter-financial advisor networks that could form in municipal debt issuance.  
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Figure 2.2. States’ Municipal Debt as a share of all U.S. States’ Municipal Debt 
Obligations. Compiled using data from the Annual Survey of State and Local 
Government Finances conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (2014).   
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Table 2.1 
 
U.S. States’ Municipal Debt Outstanding in 2013 
 
State Debt State Debt 
California 420.3 Tennessee 36.8 
New York 346.2 Oregon 34.8 
Texas 264.7 Alabama 31.6 
Illinois 148.7 Nevada 26.8 
Florida 146.4 Kansas 25.8 
Pennsylvania 130.2 Utah 19.6 
New Jersey 101.0 Oklahoma 18.9 
Massachusetts 95.4 Iowa 18.5 
Ohio 82.5 New Mexico 16.3 
Washington 77.3 Nebraska 15.0 
Michigan 76.3 Hawaii 14.3 
Virginia 65.5 Arkansas 14.2 
Georgia 55.7 Mississippi 14.1 
Colorado 53.2 Rhode Island 12.3 
North Carolina 51.5 New Hampshire 11.4 
Indiana 49.4 West Virginia 10.9 
Maryland 48.9 Alaska 9.6 
Arizona 48.7 Maine 8.4 
Minnesota 48.0 Delaware 8.3 
Missouri 45.6 Idaho 5.9 
Wisconsin 44.4 South Dakota 5.9 
Connecticut 43.4 Montana 5.3 
South Carolina 42.3 North Dakota 4.7 
Kentucky 41.7 Vermont 4.5 
Louisiana 39.0 Wyoming 2.0 
 
Note. Compiled using data from U.S. Census Bureau (2014). Figures are in Billion U.S. 
Dollars. Total debt was $2,954.7 billion for all U.S. states, including $12.4 billion for the 
District of Columbia.  
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The analysis covers 2005 to 2014. The main source of data is the CDIAC. The 
data includes bond-specific details such as date of issuance, principal amount at issuance, 
term to maturity, bond purpose, funding source, type of bond, method of sale, credit 
rating of bond, refunding status, and whether the bond is subject to state and federal 
taxation. Information on municipal market-wide conditions is from the Bond Buyer. 
Table 2.2 shows a summary of the variables and expected effects on borrowing costs. 
In total, California state and local governments issued 16,922 bonds, or CUSIPs, 
between 2005 and 2014, out of which 1,129 bonds were state government bonds. I apply 
several filters to arrive at the estimation sample. I delete observations with term to 
maturity less than 3 years, bonds with variable interest rates, and bonds with no 
information on true interest costs. The sample for estimation and analysis consists of 
1,063 fixed-rate state government general obligation bonds from 2005 to 2014.  
Borrowing cost is the dependent variable in the analysis. I measure municipal 
borrowing costs using true interest costs (TIC), which is available in the CDIAC datasets. 
Hildreth and Zorn (2005 ) highlighted this measure as the standard gauge of borrowing 
costs in municipal finance. TIC is the discount rate that sets proceeds of a bond sale equal 
to its long-term cash flows, as Equation 2.1 shows. P stands for bond price, e represents 
number of periods to earliest maturity of the bond, s is the number of semi-annual periods 
to final maturity of the bond, n represents years to maturity, t is the period index, C 
represents the coupon rate, M stands for the value of the bond at maturity, and TIC is the 
true interest cost (see Marlowe, 2009).  
𝑃 = ∑ (∑
𝐶𝑡
(1+𝑇𝐼𝐶)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 +
𝑀
(1+𝑇𝐼𝐶)𝑛
)𝑠𝑛=𝑒       (2.1) 
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Table 2.2 
 
Variables and Expected Effects on Borrowing Costs 
 
Variable Effect Measurement 
 
Borrowing cost of  
new debt issue                                      
 
 
 
True interest costs (TIC) of municipal bond.  
(Pen & Brucatto Jr., 2004; Fruit et al., 2008)  
 
Stability of issuer-
underwriter network         
 
 
- 
 
Number of repeat interactions between an issuer 
and underwriter within the past 3 years. 
(Hiklin, 2004; Li & Schurhoff, 2012) 
Method of debt issuance                  + Coded 1 for negotiated and 0 for competitive sales.  
(Marlowe, 2009)     
 
Size of debt issue - Total par value of municipal bond.  
(Marlowe, 2013; Bland, 1985) 
 
Credit rating of issue                     
 
- 
 
Ordinal level variable representing a continuum of 
low to high rating of bonds;  junk bonds,  single-A 
bonds, double-A bonds, and triple-A bonds.  
(Moldogaziev, 2012; Pen & Brucato Jr., 2004) 
 
Term to maturity  
of bond 
 
+ 
 
Number of years from date of municipal bond 
issuance to maturity date of bond.  
(Marlowe, 2011) 
 
Current market 
conditions 
 
+ 
 
Market yield spread based on the yields of 20-year 
and 5-year general obligation bonds. 
(Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004; Moldogaziev, 2012)  
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Debt network stability is the independent variable of utmost interest in this study. 
I draw from the scant literature on municipal debt networks and measure network 
stability as the number of times within the past 3 years the state government used the 
same underwriting firm to issue new bonds. This medium-term time frame is reasonable 
for identifying the pattern of repeat issuer-underwriter interactions that could emerge in 
debt issuance. Also, since the sample period in this study spans 2005 and 2014, I stretch 
the measurement of issuer-underwriter interactions beyond 2005 to the 3 years preceding 
that year; therefore, measurement of network stability uses data covering 2002 to 2014. 
Other independent variables include issue size, term to maturity of the bond, 
credit rating of the bond, method of debt issuance, and municipal market-wide 
conditions. I measure issue size as total par value of the bond (Marlowe, 2013; Bland, 
1985) and gauge credit rating of the issue using an ordinal scale that combines Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s credit rating symbols. The scale consists of different 
rating categories from 1 to 3, defined in ascending order of a bond’s credit rating (see 
Marlowe, 2011; Capeci, 1991; Bank for International Settlements, 2014). 
In addition, I measure term to maturity as the number of years from the issuance 
date to maturity date of the bond (Marlowe, 2011). Method of sale is coded 1 for 
negotiated sales, and coded 0 for competitive sales (Marlowe, 2009). Finally, I gauge 
market-wide conditions at the time of debt issuance using the yield spread between long-
term (20 year) and short-term (5 year) municipal bond market rates (Moldogaziev & 
Luby, 2012; Kalotay & May, 1998).  
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2.4 Empirical Framework 
Cross-sectional modelling is an appropriate estimation framework for assessing 
the impacts of network stability on municipal borrowing costs in the context of a single 
U.S. state. Cross-sectional regressions can accommodate non-linear patterns and year 
effects in the borrowing cost function and give additional insights on municipal bond 
issuance patterns.  
Equation 2.2 shows the general form of the cross-sectional model in this study. 𝑦𝑖 
represents true interest costs of a municipal bond, 𝒙 is a vector of independent 
variables [𝒙𝒊 = {𝑥1,𝑖, 𝑥2,𝑖, … 𝑥𝑘,𝑖}],  𝜷 is the vector of coefficients associated with the 
independent variables [𝜷 = {𝛽1, 𝛽2, … 𝛽𝑘}], i stands for the list of municipal bonds         
(i = 1, … , n),  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term (its mean is equal to zero, and it is uncorrelated 
with itself or x). 
𝑦𝑖 = ∝ + 𝜷𝒙𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖        (2.2)  
 The equation accommodates analysis of non-linear patterns and year effects. I 
analyze non-linear patterns in debt network stability using squared terms (𝑥1,𝑖
2 ). 
Specifically, I examine the second power of the network stability variable to determine 
whether it is able to explain additional variation in municipal borrowing costs. 
Furthermore, I use categorical variables defined by year of debt issuance (𝐼1,𝑖) to account 
for secular trends in the cross-sectional models. I estimate the models using robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity.   
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
A descriptive summary of the data is in Table 2.3. On average, true interest costs 
ranged from 3.41 to 5.23 percent (M=4.32, SD=0.91), reflecting considerable variation in 
cost of capital for municipal bonds covered in this study. Network stability varied widely 
in the sample. On average, each underwriter had between 12 and 103 (M=57.73, 
SD=45.50) repeat interactions with the State of California during 3 years of previous debt 
issuance activity.  
Issue size also varied widely in the sample – its standard deviation was $151 
million (M=70.5, SD=151.25). Term to maturity also varied substantially. On average, 
each bond in the sample had a term to maturity between 17.5 and 30 years (M=23.75, 
SD=6.24). Also, the maturities ranged from 3 to 35 years (MIN=2.89, MAX=35.04); this 
medium to long-term coverage reflects the exclusion of shorter maturities, which tend to 
sell in markets other than primary markets, from analyses in the present study.  
Preliminary inspection of the data on issue credit rating shows variation across 
municipal bonds and within each year. The descriptive statistics provide further insights 
and show that, on average, issue credit rating was between 0.64 and 2.38 (M=1.51, 
SD=0.87) on an ordinal scale starting from 1 (lower rating) to 3 (higher rating) .  
California issued more debt by negotiated sales (N=791) than competitive bidding 
(N=272) during the sample period. This trend seems to align well with the nation-wide 
pattern of state and local governments’ preference for negotiated debt issuance despite 
overwhelming evidence that competitive sales result in lower interest costs. As for  
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Table 2.3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Municipal Bonds 
 
  Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation Min Median Max 
 
 
True interest costs 4.32 0.91 0.96 4.30 7.44 
 
Network stability 57.73 45.50 0.00 47.00 205.00 
 
Issue size (million dollars) 70.53 151.25 0.01 13.42 1556.00 
 
Term to maturity (years) 23.75 6.24 2.89 24.23 35.04 
 
Credit rating underlying issue 1.51 0.87 1.00 1.00 3.00 
 
Issuance Method (Negotiated=1) 0.74 0.44 0 1 1 
Market yield spread 1.22 0.77 0.37 0.98 3.11 
 
Market Index 117.69 7.53 102.50 115.74 130.73 
           
 
Note. N = 1,063.  
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municipal market-wide conditions, the statistics show that, on average, yield spreads 
associated with each municipal bond varied between 0.45 and 1.99 percent (M=1.22, 
SD=0.77) with an upper bound of 3.11 percent (MAX=3.11).  
Information on underwriting activity in California gives additional insights on the 
descriptive statistics for network stability. The top five underwriting firms in the 
California sample are J.P Morgan Securities Incorporated, Merrill Lynch and Company, 
Citigroup Capital Markets Incorporated, Goldman Sachs and Company, and Morgan 
Stanley and Company. These firms lead in terms of the number and total amount of their 
municipal bond underwriting business with the state from 2005 to 2014. By comparison, 
the same firms are among the topmost 10 municipal debt underwriting firms nationwide 
(Bloomberg LLP., 2015).  
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide details on the number and dollar amount of 
underwriting activity in the sample data. In total, the State of California engaged 
underwriters with 1,063 municipal bonds, or CUSIPs, worth $74.97 billion from 2005 to 
2014. Of that total, the top five underwriters accounted for more than 78 percent of the 
number of municipal bonds and more than 79 percent of the amount of underwriting 
business. These statistics provide background information for computing the number of 
repeat interactions between the state government issuer and each underwriter in the 
sample.  
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Table 2.4 
 
Number of State Government Bonds Underwritten from 2005 to 2014 
 
Underwriting Firm Number of Bonds Share (%) 
   
JP Morgan Securities Inc. 256 24.1 
   
Merrill Lynch and Company 254 23.9 
   
Citigroup Capital Markets Inc. 144 13.5 
   
Goldman Sachs and Company 96 9.0 
   
Morgan Stanley and Company 83 7.8 
   
RBC Capital Markets 72 6.8 
   
Wells Fargo Bank National Association 48 4.5 
   
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 39 3.7 
   
E.L. De La Rosa and Company  30 2.8 
   
Lehman Brothers 23 2.2 
   
Banc of America Securities 13 1.2 
   
Bear Stearns and Company 2 0.2 
   
UBS Securities LLC 2 0.2 
   
Barclays Capital Inc. 1 0.1 
   
     
 
Note. N = 1,063. Compiled using data from California Debt and Investment Advisory 
Commission (2015).    
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Table 2.5 
 
Municipal Bond Underwriting Business from 2005 to 2014 
 
Underwriting Firm 
 
Amount      
(Billion Dollars) 
 
 
 
Share 
(Percent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Merrill Lynch and Company 23.4 31.2  
    
JP Morgan Securities Inc. 13.5 18.1  
   
Citigroup Capital Markets Inc. 11.5 15.4  
    
Goldman Sachs and Company 5.9 7.9  
    
Morgan Stanley and Company 5.1 6.8  
    
E.L. De La Rosa and Company  3.1 4.1  
    
RBC Capital Markets 3.0 4.0  
    
Wells Fargo Bank National Association 2.9 3.9  
    
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 2.4 3.2  
    
Lehman Brothers 1.4 1.9  
    
Banc of America Securities 1.0 1.4  
    
UBS Securities LLC 1.0 1.3  
    
Barclays Capital Inc. 0.4 0.6  
    
Bear Stearns and Company                             0.2 0.3  
      
 
Note. Total amount of underwriting business by all firms was $74.97 billion.      
Compiled from California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (2015) datasets.    
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2.5.2 Cross-sectional Regression Estimates  
I present estimates from two separate regressions. The first regression follows the 
basic model of true interest costs in Equation 2.2. In the second regression, I introduce 
curvilinear effects of network stability in the basic model of true interest costs. The two 
regressions test this study’s main hypothesis that municipal governments’ borrowing 
costs decline as debt management networks they belong to become more stable. Both 
estimations utilize heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  
Also, multicollinearity is not a major problem in the regressions, as variance 
inflation factors in each regression indicate. Appendix A presents multicollinearity 
diagnostics for each regression. Furthermore, residual diagnostic tests for the regressions 
show that residuals are close to a normal distribution in each regression. Appendices B 
and C display standardized normal probability (P-P) plots of residuals from each 
regression. The next sections explain the regressions in more detail.  
 
2.5.2.1 Estimates of the Basic Model of True Interest Costs 
Table 2.6 presents a summary of results from estimation of the basic model of 
true interest costs. The full regression output is in Appendix D and shows categorical 
variables for year of debt issuance. Tests of the coefficients of the year variables show 
that these variables differ significantly among themselves. The F-statistic (F = 119.68, p 
< 0.01) in Table 2.6 shows that the dependent variable, true interest costs, is significantly 
related to at least one of the independent variables in the population. The R2 statistic (R2 = 
0.703) shows that the regression model of true interest costs explains at least 70.3 percent 
of the variation in true interest costs.  
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Table 2.6 
 
Basic Linear Model: Estimates of the Determinants of Municipal Borrowing Costs 
 
Variable True Interest Costs 
  
Network stability 0.00109*** 
 (0.000410) 
 
Issue size (million dollars) 
 
0.000167 
 (0.000105) 
 
Term to maturity (years) 
 
0.0420*** 
 (0.00516) 
 
Credit rating of issue 
 
-0.156*** 
 (0.0566) 
 
Method of issuance (negotiated=1) 
 
0.291*** 
 (0.0528) 
 
Market yield spread 
 
0.242*** 
 (0.0368) 
 
Constant 
 
3.468*** 
 (0.229) 
  
 
Observations 
 
1,063 
 
F (15, 1047) 
 
119.68 
Prob > F        0.000 
 
R-squared 
 
0.703 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Estimates of the impact of network stability on true interest costs do not support 
this study’s hypothesis that municipal governments’ borrowing costs decline as debt 
management networks they belong to become more stable. The coefficient of the variable 
measuring network stability is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (t = 2.67). It 
shows that an additional increase in network stability – in other words, one more repeated 
interaction between an issuer and an underwriter in new debt issuance – raises true 
interest costs by 0.11 basis points.  
While this result does not support the stated hypothesis, it tends to support the 
alternative view in the academic literature that increasing network stability breeds 
insularity among network members, and the likely imposition of one member’s narrow 
views about the most efficient debt management strategy raises the likelihood that the 
network will make more errors in strategy, undertake more risks, and incur higher 
borrowing costs.  
Other independent variables in the basic model of true interest costs, with the 
exception of issue size, show estimates that are consistent with the theoretical 
expectations summarized in Table 2.1. As Table 2.6 shows, the variables measuring term 
to maturity, credit rating, method of issuance, and market conditions, are all significant at 
the 1 percent level. Term to maturity is positively associated with true interest costs. An 
increase in term to maturity raises true interest costs by 4.20 basis points. This supports 
the hypothesis that investors tend to associate a longer term to maturity with a higher 
likelihood of default and interest rate risk, which causes borrowing costs to rise as term to 
maturity increases.  
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Credit rating of a municipal bond has a negative relationship with true interest 
costs. As credit rating rises, true interest costs decrease by 15.60 basis points, and this 
confirms the hypothesis that credit rating of a municipal bond serves as a signal of the 
credit worthiness of the issuer and the specific bond, reduces information asymmetry 
about the bond, and lowers transaction costs for the issuer, therefore higher credit ratings 
tend to be associated with lower borrowing costs.  
Effects of debt issuance method on true interest costs support the view in the 
academic literature that, by comparing bids of underwriters to find the underwriter 
offering the least interest cost for a bond, competitive sales minimize information 
asymmetry and will result in lower borrowing costs than negotiated sales. The coefficient 
of the variable measuring method of issuance shows that negotiated sales incur higher 
borrowing costs, on average 29.05 basis points more, than competitive sales.  
Market conditions are also positively related to borrowing costs in the regressions. 
A rise in the market yield spread, which indicates worsening market conditions, increases 
true interest costs by 24.17 basis points. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
that worsening municipal market conditions raise the risks and uncertainties associated 
with state and local government debt issuance, increase transaction costs, and lead to 
higher interest costs.    
As for the variable measuring issue size, its coefficient is not significant in the 
basic model of true interest costs. I investigated this relationship further within subsets of 
the sample defined according to quartiles of issue size. This sub-sample analysis also did 
not identify any significant effects of issue size on municipal borrowing costs. Also, I 
explored curvilinear effects of issue size by adding a square term of the variable in the 
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basic model of true interest costs and still did not find significant effects. Thus, the 
present study does not find results to support the hypothesis that size of debt issuance is 
negatively related to borrowing costs. It is likely that for the cross-section of municipal 
bonds in this study, determination of a bond’s true interest costs pays little or no attention 
to size of bond as a signal of interest rate risk.  
 
2.5.2.2 Estimates of the Model with Curvilinear Network Effects  
Table 2.7 presents estimates of the regression capturing curvilinear effects of 
network stability on borrowing costs.10 The F-statistic (F = 115.29, p < 0.01) shows that 
true interest cost of debt issuance is significantly related to at least one of the explanatory 
variables in the population and the R2 statistic (R2 = 0.704) indicates that the regression 
model explains at least 70.4 percent of the variation in true interest costs.  
Estimates of the network stability variables show that a statistically significant 
curvilinear relationship exists between network stability and true interest costs. The 
coefficients of the variables measuring network stability and its square-term are 
significant at the 1 percent (t = 2.69) and 5 percent (t = 1.92) levels, respectively.  The 
coefficients show that an increase in network stability – or one more repeat interaction 
between an issuer and underwriter – increases true interest costs of debt issuance by 0.29 
basis points; however each additional repeat interaction raises interest costs less than the 
one before it, and interest costs reach a peak, then decrease at an increasing rate. 
                                                          
10 The full regression output includes categorical variables for year of debt issuance and is in Appendix E.  
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Table 2.7 
 
Model with Curvilinear Network Effects: Estimates of the Determinants of Municipal 
Borrowing Costs 
 
Variable True Interest Costs 
  
Network stability 0.00290*** 
 (0.00108) 
 
Network stability (square term)  
 
-0.0000119** 
 (0.0000062) 
 
Issue size (million dollars) 
 
0.000173 
 (0.000105) 
 
Term to maturity (years) 
 
0.0419*** 
 (0.00516) 
 
Credit rating of issue 
 
-0.156*** 
 (0.0576) 
 
Method of issuance (negotiated=1) 
 
0.292*** 
 (0.0527) 
 
Market yield spread 
 
0.256*** 
 (0.0398) 
  
Constant 3.401*** 
 (0.241) 
  
 
Observations 
 
1,063 
 
F (16, 1046) 
 
115.29 
Prob > F        0.000 
 
R-squared 
 
0.704 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The critical value in the network stability-interest costs relationship is determined 
from the coefficients of the variables measuring network stability (b1 = 0.00290) and its 
square-term (b2 = - 0.0000119) using the following standard formula: - b1 / 2b2. Based on 
this formula, true interest costs reach a peak at 121 repeat interactions. In other words, 
each new issuance of a municipal bond, or CUSIP, will lead to lower borrowing costs 
only after the issuer repeatedly used the same underwriting firm to sell 121 municipal 
bonds in the preceding 3-year period. Figure 2.3 depicts the curvilinear relationship 
between network stability (s) and borrowing costs (r) and shows the critical value (s*).  
Overall, the regression estimates in the model adjusted for curvilinear effects give 
additional insights on network stability effects on municipal borrowing costs.  The 
estimates show a threshold beyond which higher levels of network stability may lead to 
lower borrowing costs, and the finding tends to support the study hypothesis.  
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Figure 2.3. Curvilinear Relationship between Debt Network Stability and Municipal 
Borrowing Costs.   
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2.6 Summary, Conclusions, and Directions for Future Research 
This study investigated municipal debt management networks. It analyzed the 
relationship between network stability and municipal borrowing costs. Results show that 
municipal borrowing costs increase as debt management networks become more stable, 
but beyond a certain threshold of stability – in particular, after an issuer repeatedly used 
the same underwriting firm for 121 municipal bonds, or CUSIPs, in the preceding 3 years 
– borrowing costs tend to decline with each additional increase in stability. This number 
of separate CUSIPs is best understood in the context that most bonds are structured as 
part of a serial issuance, and each issuance could consist of scores of CUSIPs.   
Findings from this study deepen understanding of the impacts of network stability 
on municipal borrowing costs and present debt management policy implications. Stability 
of debt networks generally increases municipal borrowing costs. Depending on the size 
of the municipal bond, higher borrowing costs from increased stability can amount to 
millions of dollars and constrain municipal budgets. The academic literature explains 
how insularity and risk-taking both increase among network members as networks 
become more stable, and highlights how that could raise state and local government 
borrowing costs. Thus, the empirical finding that a positive statistical relationship exists 
between network stability and municipal borrowing costs should renew state and local 
managers’ focus on the stability properties and efficient performance of local debt 
management networks. In addition, knowing that a critical threshold exists beyond which 
network stability can be interest-cost reducing should guide municipal debt managers in 
gauging the efficient level of repeat interactions that can attenuate interest cost losses for 
the municipality.  
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This study is limited in its coverage of U.S. states. The empirical analyses are 
based on patterns in municipal debt issuance in California. Also, the sample dataset is 
limited to state government bonds and the networks that form between the state 
government and underwriting firms. More information is required on other U.S. states, 
and other levels of municipal government such as school districts, cities, and counties, to 
make cogent nationwide generalizations on the impacts of network stability on state and 
local government borrowing costs. Still, the California data displays considerable 
variability in bond-specific, issuer-related, and market condition variables to support 
inferences about nation-wide patterns in municipal debt management networks and 
borrowing costs.  
Much of the work on debt management networks to date have focused on network 
stability and centrality. More analytical work is needed in public administration contexts 
to fully explain how additional structural properties of networks can be applied to the 
complex public policy problems that affect state and local governments. Future studies 
should explore, for example, whether or how network cohesion – or the minimum 
number of members who if removed from a network could disconnect the group – 
matters in municipal debt issuance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MANAGING SCHOOL DISTRICT DEBT IN COMPLEX FINANCIAL MARKETS:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPTION VALUE LOSS IN DEBT REFINANCING 
 
3.1 Background and Research Questions 
Over the last three decades, the markets within which state and local governments 
manage their debt have become more complex. Major tax reforms have prompted 
stringent changes in arbitrage rules related to debt financing (Hildreth & Zorn, 2005), the 
Great Recession has spawned severe changes in liquidity and credit dynamics affecting 
risk taking and portfolio management (Bordo & Landon-Lane, 2013; Taylor, 2014), and 
sophisticated financing vehicles continue to proliferate and provide unique opportunities 
for restructuring debt obligations (Luby & Kravchuk, 2012). Amidst these complex and 
evolving market environments, state and local government debt issuers have employed 
innovative debt management strategies to maximize interest cost savings but these 
strategies also present inherent risks. 
Refinancing is a common debt management strategy among state and local 
governments. It is the issuance of new debt to replace outstanding debt. Debt refinancing 
may be compared to mortgage refinancing in residential housing contexts, even though 
there are key differences. When the mortgage rate declines, a homeowner will take on a 
new mortgage loan to replace the old mortgage loan which has a higher mortgage rate. 
This reduces the homeowner’s monthly mortgage payment. However, any similarities 
between municipal debt refinancing and mortgage refinancing end at this point due to the 
existence of call and put options in municipal bonds.  
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A call option gives the seller of the option (the municipal debt issuer) the right, 
and not the obligation, to redeem a municipal bond at a certain price and on a given date 
prior to maturity of the option (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015). On the 
other hand, a put option gives the investor the right, and not the obligation, to sell a 
municipal bond at a certain price and on a stated date prior to its maturity (Parkinson, 
1977). Issuers pay a premium to have the right to redeem a municipal bond. They pay this 
premium at the time of exercising the option and this premium reflects in the exercise or 
strike price of the option. 
With the call option in particular, an issuer may exercise the option on an existing 
bond when interest rates are lower on the call date. By replacing an existing bond with a 
new bond at a lower interest rate, the issuer obtains interest cost savings that can provide 
a measure of budget relief for the municipality. It is also possible that an issuer will 
refinance an existing bond several years prior to the call date of the bond; this is a 
sophisticated form of debt refinancing known as advance refunding.  
In an advance refunding, an issuer sells a new bond several years in advance of 
the call date of an existing bond, invests proceeds from sale of the new bond in an escrow 
account to earn interest, and uses proceeds from the escrow account to fund interest 
payments to holders of the older bond until the call date when the issuer pays off all debt 
obligations (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015; Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012). 
In this transaction, the new bond is called a refunding bond while the older bond is called 
a refunded bond. Figure 3.1 illustrates the mechanics of an advance refunding debt 
transaction.  
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Figure 3.1. Illustration of How Advance Bond Refunding Works.   
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Advance refunding differs from current refunding in regard to the length of time 
within which an issuer must retire all principal and interest payments on a refunded bond. 
In a current refunding, an issuer must use the proceeds from a refunding bond to retire all 
principal and interest payments on a refunded bond within ninety days of the advance 
refunding transaction. By contrast, in an advance refunding, an issuer must retire all 
principal and interest payments on the refunded bond at least 90 days after the issuance of 
the refunding bond (Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012).  
Issuers engage in advance refunding for at least three reasons (Peng, 2005). The 
first reason is the interest cost savings the debt management strategy gives issuers. When 
interest rates decline, issuers do not have to wait until the call date of an existing bond to 
refinance the bond. Early exercise of the call option generates interest cost savings for the 
municipality. A second reason is to lengthen the final maturity of debt obligations and 
reduce debt service payments. Even when interest rates are not lower prior to the call 
date, an issuer may replace an existing bond with a new bond in order to spread the debt 
obligation over a longer time horizon and pay less in debt service. Lengthening the 
maturity structure of the debt obligation in this way produces immediate budget relief for 
the municipality, although in present value terms the issuer’s debt service obligation may 
not be lower. A third reason is to get out of restrictive bond covenants in the older bond, 
such as the requirement of a debt reserve fund.  
What makes advance refunding a complicated debt refinancing strategy is the 
timing of the transaction. Existing federal tax law allows only a one-time execution of an 
advance refunding transaction on a bond. Thus, an issuer must choose the most 
appropriate time to engage in advance refunding to reap maximal interest cost savings 
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from the transaction. When interest rates decline, an issuer may advance refund a bond 
anytime between the date of original issuance and the first call date of the bond. Advance 
refunding results in a gain for the issuer through lower debt service. If the issuer had not 
advance refunded the bond, the issuer would be incurring higher interest costs from the 
time point defined by the refunding date until the call date. Thus, the gains from advance 
refunding can amount to millions of dollars in savings for a munciipality. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the interest cost savings that may accrue from advance refunding at a lower 
interest rate. 
On the other hand, by exercising the one-time opportunity to advance refund a 
bond when interest rates decline, the issuer loses the option to call the bond at a later 
date, if interest rates decline further between the advance refunding date and the call date. 
This lost option, or opportunity cost, is known as an option value loss. Figure 3.3 
illustrates the option value loss in an advance refunding transaction. Finance theory 
provides a way to gauge this option value loss in dollar terms using the concept of a put 
option and financial option valuation methods (Ang, Green, & Xing, 2013). Therefore, 
the option value loss serves as a gauge of the efficiency of an issuer’s timing of the 
advance refunding transaction.  
Only a few studies have examined option value loss, or the closely related subject 
of interest cost savings, in advance refunding debt transactions. Previous studies (e.g., 
Dyl & Joehnk, 1976; Zhang & Li, 2004) have examined in detail the interest cost savings 
from advance refunding. In the present study, I shift the focus of empirical analyses from 
interest cost savings to option value loss. The goal is to obtain an outcome measure to 
gauge the efficiency of advance refunding in municipal bond markets. 
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Figure 3.2. Illustration of the Gains from Advance Bond Refunding. 
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Figure 3.3. Illustration of the Option Value Loss in Advance Refunding.  
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Currently, Ang et al. (2013) is the only study that measured option value loss in 
state and local government debt refinancing. However, the study relies on simplifying 
assumptions about how option prices respond to underlying risk factors in an advance 
refunding transaction. For example, the study assumes that market price of risk changes 
linearly, or according to a time-varying trend, once per year. This assumption constrains 
the number of iterations in estimation, does not accurately represent volatility in market 
price of bonds, and can lead to imprecise estimates of option value loss.  
In the present study, I use Monte Carlo simulation procedures to compute option 
value loss. This approach improves upon the linear approach to measuring option value 
loss in Ang et al. (2013). The logic of the Monte Carlo approach to option valuation, and 
the value-added from using this approach in measuring option value loss, is well 
established in the academic literature (Bouchard & Warin, 2012; Boyle, 1977; Broadie & 
Glasserman, 1997). The method is based on the reasoning that the distribution of bond 
prices at the time of maturity, or at a specified time in the future such as the call date, is 
determined by a non-linear random process generating movements in future prices 
(Boyle, 1977). The non-linear random process the Monte Carlo procedure utilizes gives a 
more accurate representation of the dynamics in market prices than the methods in 
existing studies on option value loss. Accordingly, Ibanez and Zapatero (2004) noted that 
“Monte Carlo simulation is the appropriate method for problems of higher dimension 
and/or stochastic parameters” (page 253).   
In addition, existing work does not explain the extent to which major economic 
downturns affect option value loss. Economic shocks affect market agents’ expectations 
and valuation of municipal securities (Easley & O’Hara, 2010). During economic 
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downturns, market agents tend to lower their expectations of future returns on 
investments. This lowering of expectations raises risk and uncertainty regarding the 
future path of market interest rates. Thus, advance refunding outcomes during periods of 
economic downturn will differ significantly from outcomes in stable economic times. In 
the present study, I assess the influence of a major economic downturn, the Great 
Recession, on municipal bond advance refunding outcomes. 
More importantly, the present study focuses on school districts. Ang et al. (2013), 
the only existing study on option value loss in municipal debt refinancing, covered state 
and local governments broadly and presented only scant information on school districts’ 
market operations. The study noted that school districts incur the worst option value 
losses among subnational governments; however, the study did not provide information 
on the specific patterns and magnitudes of school district option value loss in municipal 
bond markets. The present study focuses on school district option value loss to shed more 
light on the efficient timing of their transactions in municipal bond markets. Too, the 
focus on school districts in the present study should lay the groundwork for future studies 
that investigate the relationship between efficiency of school district debt management 
outcomes and the quality of education in the local community. 
Trends in school district debt refinancing reveal a significant amount of advance 
refunding activity. Data from Bloomberg LLP. (2015) show that school districts advance 
refunded 14,826 bonds, worth $38.3 billion in par value, from 2005 to 2014. This amount 
compares with $851.6 billion in par value of all state and local government advance 
refunding during the same period. Furthermore, advance refunding activity among school 
districts appears to be associated with swings in the economy: activity peaked prior to the 
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Great Recession, slowed during the recession years, and resurged moderately in the years 
immediately following.11 Market forecasts suggest that continued recovery in advance 
refunding activity is likely as economic conditions improve further (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2015). Figure 3.4 traces the number of advance refunding 
transactions from 2005 to 2014 and Figure 3.5 shows the dollar value of the transactions.  
School districts may have engaged in refunding to obtain interest cost savings, but 
how well they timed their transactions to minimize option value loss remains to be 
adequately assessed. I ask the following questions: How much option value do school 
districts lose from advance refunding, and how do economic downturns, such as the 
Great Recession, affect advance refunding outcomes in municipal bond markets? 
I situate the study in strategic choice theory (Child, 1972; Miles, 1978) 
considering that other studies (e.g., Hildreth, 1993) have demonstrated the theory’s 
applicability to municipal debt issuance contexts. In the next sections, I explain the 
strategic choice theoretic frame underpinning this study, give a brief overview of the 
factors that motivate the decision to engage in advance refunding, identify and explain 
how specific parameters influence option value loss in advance refunding, examine 
previous work to provide insights on advance refunding outcomes and develop 
hypotheses, discuss the data, methodology, and results for the present study, and outline 
policy implications and directions for future research. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determined that the Great Recession began in 
December 2007 and ended in June 2009, extending over an 18-month period.  
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Figure 3.4. Number of Advance Refunding Transactions by U.S. School Districts. Data 
spans 2005 to 2014 and is compiled using debt issuance data from Bloomberg LLP. 
(2015). 
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Figure 3.5. Par Value of U.S. School District Advance Refunding Transactions. Data is 
compiled from Bloomberg LLP. (2015), spans 2005 to 2014, and is displayed in Billion 
U.S. Dollars.   
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3.2 Strategic Choice Theory and the Advance Refunding Debt Transaction 
Strategic choice theory explains the role leaders, or leading groups within an 
organization, play in influencing the organization’s choices in a dynamic political process 
such that the choices become part of an organizational learning process that adapts to 
both internal political situations and changing external environments (Child, 1972; Miles, 
1978; Child, 1997). The strategic choice theoretic framework has been used variously in 
the academic literature to study local government contracting-out choices (Ferris & 
Graddy, 1986), municipal government sector choices for public service delivery (Feiock, 
Clingermayer, & Dasse, 2003), local government service provision choices within 
metropolitan areas (Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005), local level decisions on social 
welfare provision (Craw, 2010 ), municipal choices during a recession (Nelson, 2012), 
and choice of foreign markets in sovereign bond issuance (Siegfried, Simeonova, & 
Vespro, 2007).  
The present study extends application of strategic choice theory to the school 
district debt refinancing research domain. Hildreth (1993) studied state and local 
governments’ strategic choices in capital markets. He highlighted the important role a 
subnational government's chief financial officer plays in designing appropriate strategies 
to achieve efficient outcomes amidst changing market conditions. His descriptions of 
state and local governments’ strategic debt market choices provide a way for connecting 
strategic choice theory to school districts’ bond refinancing decisions in the following 
way: school district boards are a top decision-making group in school district debt 
management; board members – or other external agents to whom they delegate authority 
– make strategic choices among debt refinancing options in rapidly changing economic 
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and political environments; and option value losses from the choices school district 
boards make provide a way to gauge debt management efficiency and public managers’ 
accountability to citizens.   
Essentially, the decision-making structure, debt management functions, and 
accountability standards of school district boards make it plausible to connect the 
strategic choice theory to school district advance refunding outcomes. Setting the 
advance refunding decision within the strategic choice theoretic framework requires 
consideration of two decision-making scenarios facing school district leaders. The first 
involves the decision on whether to engage in advance refunding or not. Concerning this 
decision, the academic literature outlines a range of bond-specific, issuer-related, market-
centric, and political factors that school district managers consider. I provide a brief 
explanation of these factors in Section 3.3.  
Following the decision to engage – rather than not to engage – in advance 
refunding, a second decision scenario concerns when to execute the refunding 
transaction. As Figure 3.3 illustrates, the second decision scenario defines a time space 
for an advance refunding transaction – that is, anytime from the date of original issuance 
to the first call date of the bond. That existing federal tax law allows only a one-time 
execution of advance refunding on a municipal bond makes this decision scenario a 
crucial one. Overall, school district managers’ decision to engage in advance refunding, 
and their strategic choice between different time points in executing the transaction, 
directly affects interest cost savings and, in particular, option value loss.  
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3.3 What Motivates the Decision to Engage in Advance Debt Refunding? 
A formal test of the factors that motivate subnational governments’ decision to 
engage in advance refunding is not the focus of this study. Nevertheless, this section 
gives brief explanations on the determinants of the advance refunding decision to provide 
background information on the decision-making scenarios in municipal debt refinancing.   
Economic, financial, and political considerations influence subnational 
governments’ decision to engage in advance refunding in municipal bond markets. 
Earlier attempts at explaining determinants of the refinancing decision focused on interest 
cost savings motivations (Dyl & Joehnk, 1976; Joehnk & Dyl, 1979). However, more 
recent efforts have broadened the scope of analysis to include market-wide economic 
factors and political considerations (Vijayakumar, 1995; Gupta & Lee, 2006; Zhang & 
Li, 2004; Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012; Luby, 2014). Scholars commonly consider how 
size of the debt issue, market-wide interest rates and yield curves, credit rating of the 
municipal debt issuer, and political structures in the debt-issuing jurisdiction, all 
influence the decision to engage in advance refunding.   
 
3.3.1 Size of debt issue and other issue-specific characteristics 
Larger debt issues have lower interest costs than smaller issues because larger 
debt issuers often utilize the services of large financial intermediaries who typically 
operate at lower transaction costs (Emery & Finnerty, 1991; Marlowe, 2011). Larger 
issues also have more investor interest than smaller issues (McCauley & Remolona, 
2000). Therefore, subnational issuers are more likely to engage in advance refunding of 
62 
 
larger issues because they can obtain greater interest cost savings from larger issues than 
smaller issues (Vijayakumar, 1995; Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012).  
Additionally, issuers are more likely to advance refund their bonds if the bonds 
have shorter maturities than when the bonds have longer maturities. Investors associate 
shorter maturities with lower likelihood of default and interest rate risk, and bonds with 
shorter maturities tend to have lower borrowing costs (Marlowe 2009). Therefore, issuers 
are more likely to advance refund bonds with shorter maturities because issuers can 
obtain larger interest cost savings from shorter-term bonds than longer-term bonds.  
Issue purpose is another determinant of advance refunding. Market agents view 
state and local government borrowing for education, utility, and government general 
purpose projects to be less risky than borrowing for health care and economic 
development projects, therefore issuers tend to incur lower borrowing costs for education, 
utility, and government general purpose projects that agents perceive to be less risky 
(Leonard, 1983). Thus, issuers are more likely to engage in advance refunding of less 
risky bonds because interest cost savings will be larger for these bonds than for more 
risky bonds.  
 
3.3.2 Market-wide interest rates 
Issuers are more likely to engage in advance refunding when market-wide interest 
rates are lower than when rates are higher because interest cost savings are larger when 
rates are lower (Dyl & Joehnk, 1976; Zhang & Li, 2004; Joehnk & Dyl, 1979; 
Vijayakumar, 1995). Also, in terms of the spread between long-term (20 years or more) 
and short-term (5 years or less) municipal market rates, larger yield spreads represent 
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expectations of higher future interest rates in the market, therefore issuers are more likely 
to engage in advance refunding in the current market environment to obtain interest cost 
savings (Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012).  
 
3.3.3 Credit rating and financial viability conditions of an issuer 
Credit ratings represent the level of creditworthiness of an issuer. More 
creditworthy issuers incur lower interest costs in debt issuance, hence are more likely to 
engage in advance refunding to obtain greater cost benefits than less creditworthy issuers 
(Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012; Vijayakumar, 1995). Similarly, weak financial conditions 
of an issuer, such as when an issuer cannot fulfill existing provisions in a bond covenant 
and is facing default, can cause the issuer to re-write and exit the existing provisions 
through an advance refunding (Ziese & Taylor, 1977).  
 
 3.3.4 Political Structures 
 Vijayakumar (1995) explained political incentives for advance refunding in the 
context of highly competitive political environments where leaders can utilize the 
refunding decision for patronage purposes, because the decision to refinance can provide 
substantial revenue to firms that politicians select to oversee the refunding process. Also, 
issuers may have a political incentive to engage in advance refunding and achieve lower 
debt service and budget flexibility.  
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3.4 How Specific Parameters Influence Option Value Loss 
As noted earlier, advance refunding involves two interconnected decisions – the 
decision about whether to engage in advance refunding or not, and if the decision is to 
engage in refunding, the strategic choice of a specific time to execute the transaction and 
maximize interest cost savings while minimizing opportunity costs or option value loss 
associated with the transaction. The magnitude of option value loss in advance refunding 
is contingent on three main factors: (1) time remaining until the call date; (2) risk free 
interest rates corresponding to the life remaining on the call provision; and (3) variance in 
the future value of the advanced refunded bond.  
 
3.4.1 Time Remaining Until Call Date 
Option value loss is greater if there is a longer time remaining between the time 
advance refunding occurs and the call date of the refunded bond (Ang et al., 2013). 
Longer time horizons heighten uncertainty about the profile of market interest rates and 
amplify the risk of alternative timing scenarios offering more interest cost savings than 
the existing refunding strategy.  
 
3.4.2 Risk-free Interest Rates 
Rises in risk-free interest rates magnify option value loss. Advance refunding is a 
pre-commitment to the call provision in a refunded bond and causes issuers to forfeit the 
option to call the bond again should interest rates rise, on average, prior to the call date 
(Ang et al., 2013; Kalotay & May, 1998; Miller & Folta, 2002). Therefore, rises in risk 
free interest rates raise the present value of any interest cost savings that could have 
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occurred between the time refunding occurs and the call date, thereby amplifying the 
opportunity costs associated with the advance refunding transaction.  
 
3.4.3 Volatility in the Future Value of the Bond    
Volatility in the future value of an advance refunded bond is positively related to 
option value loss. Higher rates of volatility in a bond’s trade prices reflect investor 
uncertainty about future yields on the bond, making it more advantageous for an issuer to 
delay refunding until expected interest cost savings for the bond are more certain 
(Kalotay & May, 1998) and opportunity costs less magnified.  
 
3.5 Insights from Previous Studies on Advance Refunding Outcomes 
This section presents an overview of existing studies on advance refunding 
outcomes in municipal bond markets. It considers studies that assess interest cost savings 
and examines work on option value loss. While estimation of interest cost savings is not 
the focus of the present study, the brief discussion of studies on the topic could be useful 
for understanding the analytical procedures in advance refunding studies, how the 
approaches have evolved over time, and how the methods could shape investigations on 
option value loss. 
Measurement of advance refunding gains and losses has evolved from simple 
cost-benefit calculations (e.g. Dyl & Joehnk, 1976; Kalotay & May, 1998; Brooks, 1999) 
to more intricate option pricing models (Orr, la Nuez, & Manuel, 2014; Zhang & Li, 
2004) that draw from a diverse range of mathematical finance formulations such as the 
Vasicek (1977) models, Hull and White (1990) formulae, and Monte Carlo methods.  
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Cost-benefit calculation of advance refunding outcomes involves five steps: (1) 
determining the initial cash flow, (2) determining the periodic cash flows of old and new 
bonds, (3) determining the appropriate discount rate, (4) determining the present value of 
the differential cash flows, and (5) computing the present value savings from advance 
refunding (Joehnk & Dyl, 1979).  
Researchers using cost-benefit methods have found that advance refunding 
transactions result in positive net present value savings for the issuer (Dyl & Joehnk, 
1976) and savings tend to increase as efficiency of refunding operations – measured as 
the ratio of present value cash flow savings to the total option value relinquished in a 
refunding activity – improve (Kalotay, Yang, & Fabozzi, 2007).12 
Studies that employ more sophisticated models to compute advance refunding 
outcomes often proceed in three steps: (1) determining the values for a set of simulation 
parameters that include market interest rates (either risk-free or with interest arbitrage) 
and volatility in price of bonds, (2) simulating multiple expected paths for bond price 
dynamics, and (3) computing the average of expected prices along the paths to determine 
the present value of gains or losses.   
Zhang and Li (2004) computed the net present value of interest cost savings from 
an advance refunding. They used a binomial probability model of future prices of an 
advance refunded bond to estimate the intrinsic value of the option on the bond. The 
model included information on coupon rates, market yield curves, and future bond prices. 
Their analysis utilized data on 60 bonds issued in the State of New York in 2001. They 
found that for coupon rates ranging between 2.4 and 3.0 percent, advance refunding 
                                                          
12 Kalotay et al. (2007) did not directly estimate option value relinquished or lost; rather, they analyzed a 
hypothetical advance refunding bond transaction.   
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resulted in interest cost savings ranging from 0.12 to 8.54 percent of par value, in present 
value terms.  
Zhang and Li also extended their analysis to cover refunding efficiency. Similar 
to Dyl and Joehnk (1976), they defined refunding efficiency as the ratio of the present 
value of interest cost savings to the par value of the advance refunded bond. Refunding 
efficiency ranged from 0.07 to 0.98, with most of the advance refunding transactions in 
the sample having a ratio close to 1. Ratios closer to 1 depict greater levels of refunding 
efficiency.  
Orr, la Nuez, and Manuel (2013) also investigated interest cost savings from 
advance refunding. They analyzed the outcomes from a hypothetical advance refunding 
bond transaction and found that issuers can accrue net present value savings ranging from 
$3 to $12 per $100 of par value for coupon rates between 2.5 and 5 percent. They used a 
simulation procedure to generate 10,000 trials of multiple-market yield curves from 1970 
to 2013 to calculate the net present value of interest cost savings. Similarly, Orr et al. 
(2014) assessed competing refunding policies for a sample of 220 bonds. They found that 
net present value savings of up to 3 percent of par value were possible at high levels of 
refunding efficiency.  
Studies of the interest cost savings from advance refunding give useful insights on 
municipal governments’ transactions. However, as already noted, the focus in this study 
is on the intrinsic – or option value – loss issuers incur in these transactions. Ang et al. 
(2013) is the only existing study that attempts to compute the option value loss from 
advance debt refunding. They analyzed a large dataset of U.S. state and local 
governments’ advance refunding transactions from 1995 to 2009. Their analysis utilized a 
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single factor term structure model based on the specification in Vasicek (1977) and Hull 
and White (1990) to value the option value loss from refunding. Single factor models 
attempt to explain how changes in short-term market rates affect the return on a portfolio 
of securities. Using this modelling approach to option pricing, Ang et al. found that, in a 
typical advance refunding transaction, issuers’ option value loss is approximately 1 
percent of par value. Option value losses in their sample ranged from $0.05 to $30.50 per 
$100 of par value. Also, the authors ranked the 50 largest option value losses in their 
sample according to type of municipal issuer and found that school districts incurred 30 
of the largest option value losses.  
Ang et al.’s finding that school districts incurred a majority of the worst option 
value losses seems to conform with the view in the municipal finance literature that 
school districts face peculiar challenges in debt management (Simonsen, Robbins, & 
Helgerson, 2001). Still, Ang et al. (2013) did not provide details on the specific patterns 
and magnitudes of school districts’ option value loss in municipal bond markets. 
Another limitation of Ang et al. (2013) is the assumption that short-term market 
rates – which represent the market price of risk – change linearly, or according to a time-
varying trend, once per year. Zhang and Li (2004) highlighted how market interest rates 
are non-linear and random, or stochastic, and can change anytime between the advance 
refunding date and the call or final maturity date. Zhan and Li’s characterization of 
interest rate behavior is accommodated within the Monte Carlo setting for option 
valuation. The Monte Carlo method assumes a stochastic process for determining the 
distribution of bond prices at the call or final maturity date. It discounts the average of the 
69 
 
future prices into present value terms to obtain option value loss. The method meets the 
important criteria of unbiasedness, efficiency, and consistency (Mooney, 1977). 
Consequently, I use the Monte Carlo method of option valuation to test the 
following hypothesis on school district advance debt refunding:  
H.3.1: School districts lose option value, equivalent to significant amounts of 
dollars, in advance refunding bond transactions. 
Finally, previous studies of advance refunding outcomes in municipal bond 
markets ignored the influence of economic shocks. Economic downturns tend to lower 
market agents’ expectations and their valuation of municipal securities (Easley & 
O’Hara, 2010) which heightens risk and uncertainty about future prices of bonds and 
exacerbates option value loss. Hence, I test the following hypothesis, using the Great 
Recession as a natural experiment:   
H.3.2: Option value loss is more severe during economic recessions. 
 
3.6 Data and Measurement of Variables 
Bloomberg LLP is the main source of data for analysis. I collect data on school 
district advance debt refunding. The data give details on an advance refunded bond and 
include information on date of original issuance, date on which the issuer advance 
refunded, call date embedded in the bond, price of the bond on the call date, par value of 
the bond, time to maturity, coupon rate, and identity of the school district issuer.   
I focus my analysis on Texas school districts. Hicklin (2004) emphasized the 
advantages of analyzing school district management outcomes within the setting of a 
single U.S. state, noting that it allows empirical testing of data from a single source and 
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reduces measurement inconsistency. Texas is a unique choice for analysis due to two 
main reasons. The State is the leading source of school district advance refunding 
transactions among U.S. states. It accounts for the largest share of transactions both in 
terms of frequency and total par value, as shown in Appendix F.13 Texas also has a large 
and diverse population of school districts which allows for considerable variability in the 
data. The State accounts for 10.1 percent of the nation’s K-12 enrollments, second to 
California which constitutes 12.5 percent.   
The study uses a random sample of 100 bonds, or CUSIPs, advance refunded by 
Texas school districts between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2014. Using a random 
sample to analyze patterns in municipal bond markets is not uncommon in the academic 
literature. Zhang and Li (2004) used a sample of 61 municipal bonds to analyze advance 
refunding patterns. Similarly, Orr and de la Nuez (2014) created a random sample of 220 
municipal bonds to analyze competing advance refunding policies. Also, Vijayakumar 
(1995) used a sample of 102 general obligation bonds to study state and local government 
advance refunding decisions. In the present study, I use a random sample of 100 advance 
refunded school district bonds to glean insights about the magnitude of option value loss 
among school districts, and to provide an empirical basis for future larger-scale 
explorations of patterns in school district advance refunding outcomes in municipal bond 
markets. 
Preliminary exploration of the 100, randomly selected, advance refunded Texas 
school district bonds reveals that the bonds are from 32 school district debt issuers spread 
across different geographical regions in Texas. These school district issuers also fall 
                                                          
13 State-specific statutes, fiscal rules and conventions may affect the extent to which school districts within 
a particular U.S. state undertake advance refunding of bonds. 
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within the lower, middle, and upper levels of property tax revenue base. They also 
represent small, medium, and large enrolment size categories of Texas school districts. 
These variations in the sample should support inferences about the population of school 
district advance refunding transactions.  
Computing option value loss requires information on uncertainty in future prices 
of the advance refunded bond. This option valuation parameter is explained in Section 
3.4.3. I follow the approach in Ang et al. (2013) and use volatility in secondary market 
trade prices of an advance refunded bond as a measure of uncertainty in its future 
prices.14 Consequently, I gather information on all trades in a bond for each of the 
advance refunded bonds in the sample. This makes it possible to calculate uncertainty 
that is specific to the advance refunded bond. In all, I gather 7,800 observations of 
secondary market trade prices for the advance refunded bonds in the sample. Data on 
trade prices is from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s Electronic Municipal 
Market Access platform.  
Option value loss computation also requires information on risk free interest rates. 
The link between risk-free interest rates and the magnitude of option value loss is 
explained in Section 3.4.2. I use data from the U.S. Treasury’s State and Local 
Government Series (SLGS) interest rate tables. The SLGS emerged as a risk-free 
investment vehicle among state and local governments, following the federal 
government’s restriction on investment of proceeds (e.g., from advance refunding) in 
                                                          
14 Using volatility in secondary market trade prices as a gauge of uncertainty in the future value of a bond 
seems to be the standard approach in the financial option valuation literature. Both Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
and Miller and Reilly (1987) explain how secondary market trade prices contain information about the 
value of securities in the primary market. Also, Green (2004) notes that “when some market participants 
have private information about the value of an asset, their trades reveal information to the market.” (p. 
1201).  
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higher-yielding instruments to earn arbitrage profits. Consequently, states, counties, 
cities, and school districts lock-in savings from advance refunding by placing proceeds in 
an escrow fund which holds yield-restricted U.S. Treasury securities (such as the SLGS) 
that match scheduled principal and interest payments on the advance refunded bonds 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011). In collecting data on SLGS rates, I ensure that 
the rates correspond to the life remaining in the advance refunded bond’s call provision.   
 
3.7 Methodology 
I compute option value loss using three main steps. First, I define a scenario for 
option valuation where school districts have a one-time opportunity to advance refund a 
bond prior to the call date of the bond. This option pricing scenario is closely aligned 
with existing federal tax law limiting, to just once, the number of times state and local 
governments can execute an advance refunding operation for a particular municipal bond. 
Thus, the option pricing approach defines two discrete time periods for option valuation – 
a time prior to expiration of the call option (date of advance refunding) and the time at 
which the call option on the bond expires (call date) and the issuer must proceed with 
current refunding.  
Next, I define the statistical process for future prices of the advance refunded 
bond. I follow the theoretical approach in Haug (2007) and Katz and McCormick (2009) 
and specify a stochastic process for determining future prices of advance refunded bonds. 
As noted in Section 3.5, the random non-linear process for generating future price paths 
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is more representative of the behavior of market interest rates and asset prices in financial 
markets (Zhang & Li, 2004).15  
Thus, following Haug (2007) and Katz and McCormick (2009), Equation 3.1 
outlines the stochastic process for determining future prices of the advance refunded 
bond. The model sets the natural logarithm of the advance refunded bond’s prices to 
follow the geometric Brownian motion in a Monte Carlo setting. The setting allows the 
process that generates future bond prices to be determined stochastically, and to follow 
thousands (e.g., 100,000) of future price paths. In Equation 3.1, 𝑆 is the price of the 
advance refunded bond, ∆𝑆 is the change in price of the advance refunded bond, ∆𝑡 is the 
time interval, and 𝜖𝑡 is the random draw from a standard normal distribution with 
mean (𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎) equal to 0 and 1 respectively.  
𝑆 + ∆𝑆 = 𝑆 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [(𝜇 −
1
2
𝜎2) ∆𝑡 + 𝜎𝜖𝑡√∆𝑡]                                  (3.1) 
Finally, I use an option valuation model to price the options on the advance 
refunded bond and determine option value loss. Ang et al. (2013) noted that a model to 
compute option value loss in an advance refunding must measure the value of a put 
option on the advance refunded bond. They noted the following:  
“The value lost to issuers from the pre-refunding decision is the value of a put 
option exercisable at the call price of the original bond with a maturity equal to 
the call date of the original bond.”  (p. 20) 
                                                          
15 What actually happened to interest rates and bond prices is known ex-post. At the time that advance 
refunding occurs, however, it is not certain whether future prices of the advance refunded bond will be 
higher or lower, on average, compared to prices at the time of refunding. The Monte Carlo option-pricing 
technique simulates a series of random non-linear paths for future prices of the advance refunded. The 
method assumes a stochastic process for determining the distribution of bond prices at the call or final 
maturity date of the bond. This forward-looking, or ex-ante, approach more accurately reflects the 
uncertainty about future interest rates and bond prices that issuers face at the time of advance refunding. 
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In option valuation, the value of a put option is expressed as the difference 
between the exercise price of an asset and the price of the asset at the expiration of the 
option. Equation 3.2 outlines the value of the put option on an advance refunded bond 
using the basic model outlined in Haug (2007). The specification in Equation 3.2 is the 
main model for computing option value loss in the present study. It accomodates the 
stochastic process for determining future prices described in Equation 3.1. Thus, 
Equation 3.1 is a subset of Equation 3.2 and the two equations are connected by means of 
the parameter S. In Equation 3.2, 𝑝 is the put option on the advance refunded bond, S is 
the price of the advance refunded bond, T is the time remaining until the call date, X is 
the exercise price on the call date, and r is the risk-free market interest rate.  
𝑝 =
𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑛
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑋 − 𝑆𝑒(𝑏−𝜎
2 2⁄ )𝑇+𝜎𝜖𝑖√𝑇 , 0]𝑛𝑖=1                      (3.2)   
Equation 3.2 computes option value loss as the discounted average of option 
prices for the advance refunded bond. It computes the discounted average of option prices 
along all simulated paths of future prices of the advance refunded bond. I quantify this 
loss as a proportion of the par value of the advance refunded bond and sum up the losses 
for all school district transactions in the sample over the study period. Furthermore, I 
group the sample estimates of option value loss into epochs preceding, during, and after 
the Great Recession to assess the magnitude of loss across time periods.  
 
3.8 Results 
MATLAB is the programming software used to implement the Monte Carlo 
option pricing model in the present study. The program simulation codes are based on 
Equation 3.2 and are displayed in Appendix G. Monte Carlo simulations show patterns in 
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school districts’ option value loss. Figure 3.6 shows the option value loss associated with 
each of the 100 advance refunded school district bonds in the sample. Three major tiers 
of option value loss can be identified: losses below $2 per $100 of par value; losses 
ranging between $2 and $5 per $100 of par value; and losses that extend beyond $5 per 
$100 of par value. These lower, medium, and upper tiers of option value loss account for 
35 percent, 36 percent, and 29 percent of all transactions, respectively. Option value 
losses ranged from $0.06 to $27.16 per $100 of par value. Appendix H shows the 
histogram of the distribution of option value loss.  
 Table 3.1 presents sample statistics from the Monte Carlo simulations. On 
average, school districts executed advance refunding transactions 2.4 years prior to the 
call date of the advance refunded bonds. Also, volatility in the price of bonds underlying 
these transactions was substantial, at 9.5 percent on average. Risk-free interest rates 
associated with the maturity structure of the advance refunded bonds were moderate, at 
2.0 percent on average, and did not change dramatically over the time period covered in 
this study. As noted earlier, time to the call date, volatility in bond price, and changes in 
risk free interest rates, all combine to influence the magnitude of option value loss in an 
advance refunding bond transaction. 
Results from Table 3.1 show that between 2005 and 2014 school districts lost, on 
average, $3.28 per $100 of the par value of bonds in their advance refunding transactions. 
As discussed earlier, this result on school districts reveals a greater magnitude of loss, on 
average, compared to Ang et al.’s (2013) estimate of $1 per $100 of par value for all state 
and local governments. The larger average margin of loss in the present study could be a 
reflection of the peculiar challenges school districts face in complex financial markets.   
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Figure 3.6. Option Value Loss in a Random Sample of School District Advance  
Refunding Transactions. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Monte Carlo Simulations of Option Value Loss: Results for Full Sample of Advance 
Refunded School District Bonds 
 
Option Valuation Results    
       Total Par Value Advance Refunded ($ Millions) 510.86   
       Total Option-Value Loss ($ Millions) 16.78   
       Percent of Par Value Lost to School Districts 3.28   
Monte Carlo Simulation Parameters    
       Risk-free interest rate, r (sample average)  0.020   
       Volatility in bond price, σ (sample average) 0.095   
       Years remaining until call date, T (sample average) 2.41   
       Number of simulations per asset pricing scenario, M 100,000   
Sample Statistics    
       Number of advance refunded bonds 100   
       Number of trades in advance refunded bonds 7,800   
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 Indeed, it is unsurprising that school districts’ option value losses ranged from 
$0.06 to $27.16 in the present study. By comparison, losses ranged from $0.05 to $30.50 
per $100 of par value in Ang et al. (2013), and the authors noted (without giving specific 
details) that school districts incurred a majority of the worst option value losses. Overall, 
the findings reported in Table 3.1 confirm this study’s hypothesis that school districts 
lose option value, equivalent to significant amounts of money, in advance refunding 
transactions.  
 Results also confirm the hypothesis that school district option value loss is more 
severe during economic recessions. As Table 3.2 shows, average option value loss in the 
period prior to the Great Recession was $1.83 per $100 of par value. During the 
recession, average losses increased to $3.46 per $100 of par value. In the years 
immediately following the recession, option value losses lingered on, reaching $4.45 per 
$100 of par value, on average. 
 While macroeconomic shocks, such as downturns in the economy, may have 
magnified school districts’ losses in municipal bond markets, specific aspects of their 
transactions also may have resulted in losses. For one thing, outcomes from an advance 
refunding transaction are more adverse the longer the time span between the refunding 
date and the call date of the refunded bond. For the sample of school district bonds in this 
study, average time to the call date is 2.4 years. This relatively lengthy window raises 
uncertainty about the profile of market interest rates between the time advance refunding 
occurs and the call date of the advance refunded bond. Such uncertainty heightens the 
risks associated with the advance refunding transaction and amplifies option value loss. 
In addition, school district bonds in the sample, typical of municipal bonds generally,  
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Table 3.2 
 
Monte Carlo Simulations of Option Value Loss: Results for Advance Refunding 
Transactions in Different Time Periods 
 
Panel A: Option-Value Loss in Pre-Recession years   
       Total Par Value Advance Refunded ($ Millions) 127.63  
       Total Option-Value Loss ($ Millions) 2.33  
       Percent of Par Value Lost to School Districts 1.83  
Panel B: Option-Value Loss During the Recession    
       Total Par Value Advance Refunded ($ Millions) 283.24  
       Total Option-Value Loss ($ Millions) 9.79  
       Percent of Par Value Lost to School Districts 3.46  
Panel C: Option-Value Loss in Post-Recession years    
       Total Par Value Advance Refunded ($ Millions) 99.99  
       Total Option-Value Loss ($ Millions) 4.44  
       Percent of Par Value Lost to School Districts 4.45  
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trade infrequently in secondary markets. A large proportion of the bonds in the sample, 
about 80 percent, traded less than 100 times over the entire tenure of the bond, causing 
considerable volatility in their trade prices.  
 
3.9 Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Directions for Future Research 
Advance refunding may be an attractive interest-cost saving strategy for school 
districts but the transaction can generate significant opportunity costs equivalent to 
millions of dollars if it is not properly timed, or if it responds adversely to underlying 
bond-specific and market-risk factors. This study contributes to the scant literature on 
advance refunding in municipal bond markets by: (1) focusing exclusively on school 
districts, (2) analyzing option value loss in school district advance refunding transactions, 
(3) using the Monte Carlo technique for option-pricing to quantify school districts option 
value loss, and (4) accommodating the influence of external disturbances, such as the 
Great Recession, in advance refunding outcomes. Findings show that school districts lost 
option value, equivalent to millions of dollars, from their advance refunding bond 
transactions between 2005 and 2014, and option value losses were more severe during 
downturns in the economy.  
School district debt managers must consider the timing of bond transactions, 
especially in dynamic market environments that easily exacerbate losses from ill-timed 
operations. Debt managers that take into account volatility in the price of a bond, the 
profile of current and future market rates, and macroeconomic swings, are more likely to 
minimize option value loss in advance refunding and generate savings for their school 
districts. Further, municipal bond market regulators have an obligation to improve the 
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environment for secondary market trading of bonds. As regulators work to enhance 
market efficiency, and trading activity in bonds increases, option value losses will be 
mitigated due to decreased volatility in bond prices.   
This study did not examine all possible advance refunding scenarios facing public 
debt managers in municipal bond markets. For example, it is plausible to compute the 
option value loss school districts incur when they advance refund at a specific time, 
relative to refunding at an optimal date. The computation of option value loss in that case 
will require a derivation of the optimal exercise date. This is a research subject future 
studies could explore further. To that end, existing work on optimal timing of advance 
refunding (e.g., Kalotay & May, 1998) can provide a useful guide.  
Finally, future studies should explore the linkages between outcomes from school 
district debt management strategies and the quality of education in the local community: 
Do school districts that incur the largest losses in financial market transactions also lag 
behind in educational quality in the local community? What causations, if any, exist 
between outcomes from market transactions and educational outcomes? Answers to these 
questions will provide a way to assess school district financial management in the context 
of its impacts on educational outcomes of children in the local community.  
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CHAPTER 4 
REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  
DOES REGULATORY DISCLOSURE IMPROVE PRICE EFFICIENCY IN 
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES SECONDARY MARKETS? 
 
4.1 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions 
Regulation of municipal bond markets involves a partnership between the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA), and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). Of the three 
agencies, the MSRB has a mandate to provide regulatory oversight on brokers, dealers, 
and municipal advisors, with the goal of promoting fair issuance and trading practices to 
enhance market efficiency (Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
Since its creation in 1975, the MSRB has required market dealers to disclose 
information on primary market issuance and secondary market trading of municipal 
securities. However, a major leap forward occurred on March 31, 2008 when the Board 
launched the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) – an online disclosure portal 
that provides free public access to municipal bond disclosure documents and near real-
time data on secondary market trade prices. Between March 31 2008 and June 1 2009, 
the MSRB, with approval by the SEC, implemented a series of major disclosure 
requirements, including auction rate securities disclosure, variable rate demand 
obligations transparency, all-electronic official statement dissemination standards, and 
electronic continuing disclosure. The MSRB required broker-dealers to disclose trade 
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information, on a near-real time basis, to the EMMA information platform. The goal was 
to strengthen the information environment for municipal bond issuance and trading. 
The EMMA information disclosure regime provides a natural experiment for re-
examining the impact of regulatory interventions on municipal securities trade prices. 
Most of the existing studies on secondary market information disclosure (e.g., Schultz, 
2012) analyzed earlier information disclosure regimes. The few studies on the EMMA 
disclosure interventions (e.g., MSRB, 2014b) do not provide a full picture of regulatory 
effectiveness because they ignore the influence of market-wide factors on securities trade 
prices. I attempt to fill that research gap by considering trade-specific, bond-related, and 
market-wide factors in analysis of trade price effects of the EMMA regulatory 
interventions. Specifically, I address the following research question: What is the impact 
of the EMMA regulatory interventions on secondary market pricing of municipal bonds? 
Another source of concern for regulatory policy is the finding that trade prices in 
municipal securities secondary markets tend to favor big (or institutional) investors over 
small (or retail) investors (Schultz, 2012; Harris & Piwowar, 2006; Green, Hollifield, & 
Schurhoff, 2007). The few studies on the EMMA interventions (e.g., Cuny, 2013) do not 
fully explicate this problem, as they do not present strong evidence that the interventions 
reduced the price advantage institutional investors have over retail investors in municipal 
securities secondary market trades. The present study attempts to fill that gap in the 
literature by examining whether the EMMA information disclosure initiatives had 
significantly different price impacts between retail and institutional investors. Hence, I 
address the following research question: How has institutional investors' trade price 
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advantage over retail investors changed in the aftermath of the EMMA regulatory 
interventions?  
In the next sections, I examine in more detail the academic literature on the trade 
price impacts of regulatory disclosure interventions in municipal bond markets and 
outline hypotheses based on the literature review. Further, I present the data, 
methodology, and empirical findings of the study, and provide policy recommendations 
and directions for future studies.  
 
4.2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
Market efficiency is a major emphasis in regulation of financial markets. Fama 
(1970) explained that efficiency exists when prices fully reflect available information in a 
market, such that firms can make production-investment decisions and investors can 
choose among investment alternatives with zero transaction costs. Other researchers, 
notably Jensen (1978) and Jarrow and Larsson (2012), state that market efficiency exists 
if it is impossible for some market participants to make economic profits by trading on 
the basis of market information sets available to them only. According to Akerlof (1970), 
the potential for quality uncertainty and information asymmetry in markets accounts for 
the existence of economic and regulatory institutions that aim at reducing distortions in 
markets.16  
Besides market efficiency, the public administration literature has discussed rule 
of law (Argyriades, 2003), equity (Kelly, 1998), citizen participation (DeLeon & 
                                                          
16 Among other illustrations of inefficiency in markets, Akerlof (1970) discussed extortionate rates charged 
by local moneylenders in underdeveloped credit markets and the control of such markets by dominant 
market players.   
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Denhardt, 2000), and citizens’ welfare (Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002) as important to 
the determination of market outcomes and regulation policy. Researchers have found 
evidence that securities trading is less transparent in municipal bond markets, compared 
to corporate bond markets (Chakravarty & Sarkar, 2003), and trade prices tend to favor 
institutional investors over retail investors (Schultz, 2012; Green et al., 2007), which 
raises equity and citizen welfare implications. Moreover, Hildreth and Zorn (2005) 
chronicled a number of recent defaults and/or debt management problems involving state 
and local governments and noted how those adverse outcomes prompted regulatory 
provisions aimed at adequate protection for taxpayers.  
By means of continuing disclosure requirements in both primary and secondary 
markets, the SEC, working together with the MSRB, seeks to ensure that trade prices 
investors face are fair and efficient. The regulatory landscape for municipal securities has 
recorded significant milestones since Congress and the SEC created the MSRB in 1975. 
Appendix I gives a detailed timeline of regulatory initiatives. Over the years, the MSRB 
has established Uniform Practice Rules (1976), created Rules on Underwriting Practices, 
Fair Practice, and Yield Comparisons (1978), released a Comprehensive Report on 
Pricing (1980), required Filings of Disclosure Documents (1990), adopted the 
groundbreaking Pay-to-Play Rule G-37 (1993), published Daily Trade Reports to 
enhance market transparency (1998), made available Comprehensive Real-Time Trade 
Reports and required dealers to submit transaction information to the MSRB within 15 
minutes of execution of all trades (2005), and launched EMMA (2008), a disclosure 
platform which for the first time made available, from a single source and free of charge, 
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historical and real-time municipal securities trade data (Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board, 2014a).  
Studies have analyzed the impacts of information disclosure initiatives on 
outcomes such as pricing and liquidity in the secondary market. A recent study by the 
MSRB (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 2014b) showed that increased 
information disclosure following the EMMA interventions in 2008 had a restraining 
impact on mark-up prices of municipal securities trades. However, the study did not 
analyze the influence of market-wide factors; thus, it did not present a full picture of the 
trade price impacts of EMMA regulatory interventions.  
Other notable contributions on the relationship between regulatory disclosure 
initiatives and pricing outcomes in secondary municipal bond markets include Reck and 
Wilson (2006), Green et al. (2007), Schultz (2012), and Cuny (2013). Reck and Wilson 
(2006) assessed the impact of a new disclosure requirement, initiated in 1994, on price 
transparency in the secondary market. The 1994 rule was an improvement on a previous 
rule in 1989 (Rule 15c2-12) and required that brokers, dealers, and underwriters obtain a 
written agreement from issuers of municipal bonds that they will make continuing annual 
disclosures on their bond sales to the public. The 1989 rule had required underwriters to 
obtain bond issuance information but not on a continuing annual basis. Reck and Wilson 
compared efficiency of pricing in the pre-rule (1978–1989) and post-rule (1996-1998) 
periods. They examined the annual disclosure documents of 289 cities across 30 U.S. 
states and used data on end-of-the-month secondary market trade prices of general 
obligation bonds. They found that the post-rule period witnessed less market return 
variability (or more efficient pricing) than the pre-rule period. According to the authors, 
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the requirement of continuing disclosure led to more diffuse adjustments of trade prices 
in the post-rule period.   
 Green et al. (2007) did not focus on a specific information disclosure event. They 
created a statistical distinction between informed and uninformed investors in the 
secondary market to assess the impact of increased information disclosure on trade 
prices. They used size of transactions as the measure of information disparities; larger 
transaction sizes representing informed or institutional investors, and smaller sizes 
signifying uninformed or retail investors. The authors found that more informed 
(institutional) investors faced trade prices that were close to the reoffering price of the 
bond while uninformed (retail) traders faced higher levels of price dispersion.  
 Schultz (2012) focused on MSRB’s introduction of a new information disclosure 
requirement in 2005. In that year, the regulatory agency required that market participants 
disclose comprehensive trade reports within 15 minutes of the transaction. Schultz found 
that improved information disclosure under the comprehensive 15-minute time-lag trade 
reporting reduced price mark-ups for the market as a whole, and raised institutional 
investor prices relative to retail investor prices. He argued that the increase in institutional 
investor trade prices was due to adjustment of market prices from a prior market 
imbalance wherein institutional investors had an informational advantage over retail 
investors.  
Cuny (2013) measured the impacts of the EMMA information disclosure regime. 
She assessed the impact of disclosure initiatives in three main areas: (1) supply of 
information disclosure in the market, (2) trade volume or market liquidity, and (3) mark-
up prices retail investors face relative to institutional investor mark-up prices. Cuny’s 
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study covered 2007 to 2012 and her results showed that information disclosure initiatives 
under EMMA increased supply of information disclosure and trade volume among 
market participants. However, she did not find strong evidence that the disclosure 
initiatives lessened the informational advantage institutional investors have over retail 
investors. The lack of strong evidence on the impact of the EMMA interventions on trade 
prices different investor segments face makes it necessary to re-examine the impact of the 
interventions using more recent data.    
Schultz’s (2012) study was considerably different from Cuny’s (2013) work. The 
two scholars investigated different disclosure initiatives; Schultz examined MSRB’s 15 
minute-lag comprehensive trade reporting requirement initiated in 2005, while Cuny 
studied the EMMA near-real time information disclosure requirements initiated in 2008.   
Further, Schultz assessed the effect of information disclosure on trade prices in the 
market as a whole and on different market segments, while Cuny focused only on trade 
price effects among different investor segments – the market-wide analysis in Cuny’s 
work centered on trade volume and liquidity, and not trade price effects. Also, whereas 
Schultz found evidence that increased information disclosure reduced informational bias 
between retail and institutional investor segments, Cuny found weak evidence. 
The present study builds on the existing literature in two major ways. I assess the 
impact of the EMMA information disclosure interventions on trade prices in the secondary 
market as a whole. This extends the knowledge in previous studies (e.g., Schultz, 2012) 
that assessed the price impacts of information disclosure using previous regulatory 
disclosure initiatives. It also extends knowledge in previous studies (e.g., Cuny, 2013) that 
did not examine EMMA’s impacts on trade pricing in the secondary market as a whole. 
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Furthermore, by including market-wide conditions in the analysis, the present study gives 
a more complete picture of the impact of the EMMA interventions on trade prices, 
compared to the approach in previous studies (e.g., MSRB, 2014b). I expect to find that 
information disclosure interventions improve trade price efficiency in municipal securities 
secondary markets, consistent with predictions in the theory of market efficiency.  
As the theory would suggest, transaction costs in municipal securities trading 
arise partly from information asymmetry between market dealers and investors (Green et 
al., 2007). In the absence of timely and accessible market-wide information, investors 
incur high search costs for fundamental information on trades and dealers charge higher 
mark-up prices to maintain their premiums in the high cost information environment. High 
search costs also create wide differences (or differentials) and rapid changes (or volatility) 
in prices investors face, thereby creating pricing distortions and limiting price efficiency. 
However, public dissemination of executed trade prices reduces search and transaction 
costs for investors and lowers distortions in mark-up prices broker-dealers charge 
(Schultz, 2012). Thus, I test the following hypothesis (Reck & Wilson, 2006; Schultz, 
2012): 
H.4.1: EMMA regulatory disclosure interventions are associated with a 
significant improvement in the efficiency of municipal securities secondary 
market trade prices.  
Another significant contribution of the present study is the comparative 
assessment of regulatory disclosure impacts on retail and institutional investor segments 
of the secondary market. As highlighted above, previous studies on the subject either 
focus on regulatory disclosure regimes prior to EMMA (e.g., Reck & Wilson, 2006; 
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Schultz, 2012) or do not find strong evidence of EMMA’s impacts (e.g., Cuny, 2013). In 
the present study, I use more recent data to examine whether the EMMA regulatory 
disclosure interventions are associated with a reduction in the trade price advantage 
institutional investors have over retail investors.   
Based on market efficiency theory, I expect regulatory disclosure interventions to 
reduce the informational advantage an investor segment may have over another in trade 
pricing. Different segments of investors face different prices in securities trades because 
dealers discriminate between investors they view as informed about relative prices – 
institutional investors – and those investors they consider to be unsophisticated and 
lacking fundamental information about relative trade prices – retail investors (Green et 
al., 2007). Dealers view institutional investors as more informed than retail investors 
because institutions are able to collect price quotes from more dealers and are more aware 
of trade prices that other institutions pay (Schultz, 2012). As such, the informational 
advantage institutional investors have over retail investors allows dealers to extract 
higher rents from retail investors in the form of higher mark-up prices, compared to 
institutional investors (Keloharju & Torstila, 2002). Therefore, regulatory disclosure 
initiatives drive public dissemination of executed trade prices to even out the information 
environment among different investor groups and counteract any rent-seeking behaviors 
of dealers. Thus, I test the following hypothesis (Reck & Wilson, 2006; Schultz, 2012; 
Cuny, 2013): 
H.4.2: The EMMA regulatory disclosure interventions are associated with a 
reduction in the price advantage institutional investors have over retail investors 
in municipal securities secondary market trades.   
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Other factors influence trade prices and these include trade-specific (trade 
frequency and trade size), bond-related (issue size, term to maturity, and coupon rate), 
and market condition (yield spread between long-term and short-term bonds) variables. 
Trade frequency refers to the number of times a bond trades in the secondary market 
during the day or week. An increase in trade frequency is associated with lower cost of 
trading and improvement in price efficiency (Conrad, Wahal, & Xiang, 2015). However, 
an increase in the number of trades may also cause the range of daily or weekly prices to 
increase and raise volatility in these prices (Downing & Zhang, 2004) due to the larger 
volume of different price quotes for the bond, ceteris paribus. Increasing price 
differentials and volatility reflect distortions and inefficiency in trade pricing.  
Trade size is the dollar value of the block of a bond that is traded. The academic 
literature distinguishes between small trades by retail investors and large trades by 
institutional investors (Reck & Wilson, 2006; Schultz, 2012) and, in most cases, uses 
thresholds based on dollar amount traded to distinguish between the two types of investor 
trades. Trade size is negatively related to price differentials and volatility in secondary 
market trading. Smaller trade sizes create a noisy trading environment that widens the 
range of daily trade prices and increases volatility in the prices (Downing & Zhang, 
2004). Increasing price differentials and volatility signal inefficient pricing.  
Issue size refers to the dollar amount of the debt issue in the primary market for 
municipal securities. Similar to trade size, the academic literature distinguishes between 
smaller issues and larger issues and notes how size of debt issuance may reflect variations 
in fiscal capacity, access to national markets, and other characteristics among issuers 
(Daniels & Ejara, 2009; Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004). In secondary market securities 
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trading, issue size is positively related to daily price differentials and volatility in daily 
prices. Investors prefer to trade in larger issues and the increase in demand for these debt 
issues, particularly from retail investors who flock to them, raises the range of daily 
prices, increases price differentials, and heightens price volatility (Downing & Zhang, 
2004; Moldogaziev, 2012), which all reflect inefficient pricing. 
Term to maturity is the number of years remaining from the time a subnational 
government issues debt in the primary market until the time the bond matures and the 
issuer pays bondholders the face value of the bond. Term to maturity is expected to be 
positively related to differentials and volatility in daily prices of secondary market trades. 
Debt issues with longer term to maturity tend to have more enhanced features, such as 
call provisions and insurance, which compensate for any wide distortions or volatility in 
their pricing and make them more preferred investment assets among secondary market 
traders (Downing & Zhang, 2004). 
Coupon rate is the annual or semi-annual interest an issuer pays to bondholders. 
Issuers may set coupon rates to be fixed or flexible at the time of debt issuance in the 
primary market. Fixed coupon rates allow bondholders in primary markets to know with 
certainty how much interest they will earn over the term of the bond. Flexible coupon 
rates, on the other hand, allow some variation in interest payments in response to market-
wide interest rate changes or interest rate risk. Investors in secondary markets tend to 
demand higher yields or coupons to compensate for higher interest rate risk and price 
volatility (Moldogaziev, 2012). Therefore, coupon rate is expected to have a positive 
relationship with range and volatility of trade prices on a given day.   
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Market-wide interest rate conditions contain information on investors’ 
expectations about future rates and their perceptions of risks and uncertainties in the 
municipal market. Scholars have analyzed market-wide interest rate conditions using 
indices that measure the spread between long-term (20 years or more) and short-term (5 
years or less) bonds (Moldogaziev, 2012; Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004). Widening spreads 
indicate increasing tensions and uncertainties in the municipal securities market and tend 
to raise the daily range and volatility of trade prices (Harris & Piwowar, 2006).  
 
4.3 Data, Sample, and Variables 
Between March 31 2008 and June 1 2009, the MSRB implemented a series of 
major disclosure initiatives through its EMMA information dissemination platform with 
the goal of strengthening the information environment for municipal bond trades. The 
pre-EMMA and post-EMMA time frames define a natural break point for data on 
secondary market trades of municipal securities. The event studies literature gives 
insights on the appropriate length of time to choose in before-and-after analyses. Scholars 
have suggested that, in studies of events related to the municipal bond market, using 
transaction prices occurring several years before and after an event substantially increases 
the power of empirical tests, despite the greater non-event noise that a lengthier window 
could generate (Ederington, Guan, & Yang, 2015). In the present study, I set the event 
window from 2005 to 2014, which is a lengthy period, to accommodate analysis of 
several market trends and their interplay with municipal securities secondary market 
prices. By comparison, Cuny’s (2013) study on EMMA impacts covers 2007 to 2012. 
Furthermore, event studies emphasize careful selection of event dates within the 
full length of time defined for the study (Binder, 1985). Especially in regard to analysis 
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of regulatory effects, the academic literature demonstrates that events are often long 
anticipated by market agents (Binder, 1998), and even when they do occur, they may 
require some time to be built into agents’ reactions; therefore, impact analysis must 
consider not only the dates they occur but also allow for flexibility around specified event 
dates (Sorokina, Booth, & Thornton Jr, 2013) or adjust for a transition period (Chalmers, 
Liu, & Wang, 2013). Implementation of the latest disclosure initiatives spanned March 
31, 2008 and June 1, 2009; therefore, I set the pre-regulatory disclosure period between 
March 31, 2008 and June 30, 2009 to allow up to 30 days for the transition.17 
Consequently, I measure the impacts of regulatory disclosure on trade prices using a 
categorical variable named EMMA that is coded 1 for the post-EMMA regime (after June 
30, 2009) and 0 for the pre-EMMA regime (before June 30, 2009).  
Trade price differential is the dependent variable in this study. I measure trade 
price differential as the difference between the lowest price of a customer-buy transaction 
and the highest price of a customer-sell transaction on a given day. For trades that are not 
paired, I use the average price of interdealer trades on a given day. Downing and Zhang 
(2004) and Moldogaziev (2012) used a similar approach for computing trade price range 
but aggregated trade prices into weekly rather than daily bundles. Choice of a daily 
periodicity for this study provides a way to tease out more information on the 
determinants of trade prices in new information environments characterized by near-real 
time market data. Furthermore, I obtain an alternative measure of the dependent variable 
                                                          
17 In their study of an earlier regulatory disclosure regime, Chalmers et al. (2013) set a transition period of 2 
months. Cuny (2013) also set a transition period of 6 months. The present study uses a 30-day transition 
period. I analyzed the robustness of the 30-day transition period by examining alternative transition periods 
of 3 months (September 1, 2009) and 6 months (December 1, 2009) but these sensitivity tests did not 
significantly alter the impacts of regulatory disclosure on price efficiency.   
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using volatility in trade prices, which I compute as the price differential weighted by 
average price of paired or interdealer trades on a given day (Downing & Zhang, 2004).  
Independent variables include trade frequency, trade size, issue size, term to 
maturity, coupon rate, and market yield spread. I measure trade frequency as the number 
of times a bond, or CUSIP, is traded on a given day (Moldogaziev, 2012). Trade size is 
an interval level variable that measures, in millions of dollars, the par value of trade in a 
security or bond. Also, scholars have used size of trade as a proxy for the type of investor 
(institutional or retail) involved in the security trade. Following the lead of earlier studies 
(e.g., Peng & Brucato Jr., 2004; Harris & Piwowar, 2006), I categorize trades with par 
value less than $100,000 as retail investments and trades with par value greater than or 
equal to $100,000 as institutional investor trades. Both trade frequency and trade size are 
trade-specific variables and describe activity in the secondary market for municipal 
securities.  
Issue size is an interval level variable measured in million dollars (Downing & 
Zhang, 2004). Term to maturity is also an interval level variable representing the number 
of years from the time of issuance until maturity of the bond (Moldogaziev, 2012). 
Similarly, coupon rate is an interval level variable that describes the annual interest an 
issuer pays to bondholders. All three variables are issue-specific and describe features 
associated with primary market issuance of bonds traded in the secondary market.  
Market yield spread is an interval level variable that gauges municipal market-
wide interest rate conditions and expectations. It is defined as the yield spread obtained 
from long-term (20 years or more) bonds and short-term (5 years or less) notes (Harris & 
Piwowar, 2006; Moldogaziev, 2012). I use a market index that tracks the spread between 
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the long-term bonds and short-term notes while allowing for cross-market dynamics 
between municipal and Treasury markets.  
Source of data for the municipal market index is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. Other sources of data are MSRB and Bloomberg LLP. Trade data from MSRB 
consists of information on trading and settlement dates, trade amounts, transaction prices, 
yields, and transaction type (e.g., customer purchase, customer sale, or interdealer 
transaction). Bloomberg LLP. gives information on primary market debt issuance, 
including date of issuance, size of the issue, term to maturity, coupon rate, issuer’s credit 
rating, and whether a bond is insured or not.   
I limit consideration of municipal securities secondary market trades to bonds 
issued in California for two reasons. California is one of three U.S. states – Texas and 
Washington are the others – that require issuers to disclose underwriter spreads and other 
sets of transaction price information, making transactions data publicly available through 
oversight agencies, namely, the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission, 
the Texas Bond Review Board, and the Washington State Department of Commerce; 
these datasets provide useful comparisons with MSRB and Bloomberg data to ensure 
consistency of data in secondary market trade analyses (Marlowe, 2013).  
California is also the leading source of municipal securities secondary market 
trades among all U.S. states. California accounted for 16.1 percent of all daily trades 
nationwide from 2005 to 2014; it topped New York (13.2 percent) and Texas (10.1 
percent), which had the second and third largest shares, respectively, with all the other 
states accounting for average daily trade shares below 5 percent. While data on California 
alone may not be representative of patterns in municipal securities trading in the entire 
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nation, trading patterns in the state show considerable coverage and variation to support 
generalizations, as shown in the descriptive statistics in Section 4.5.1.  
To arrive at the sample of municipal bond trades for empirical analysis, I draw a 
random sample of 100 municipal bonds, or CUSIPs. These are California state 
government fixed-rate general obligation bonds stratified across the 10-year period 
starting from 2005 to 2014. I trace each of the 100 bonds in the secondary market for the 
first six months of trading. Moldogaziev (2012) used a 5-month window to trace trading 
activity of bonds in the secondary market and highlighted how a window lasting several 
months is appropriate for capturing pricing behavior during the times that bonds are on-
the-run (active trading in a bond that occurs during the days immediately following its 
issuance) and off-the-run (relatively calmer periods of trading in a bond usually after the 
first 90 days of issuance). 
The stratified random sample of 100 municipal bonds, or CUSIPs, issued by 
California from 2005 to 2014, generates 27,807 observations of municipal bond trades, 
being trades in all bonds during the first six months of their issuance. Next, I classify 
trade information for each bond by trading day. All 27,807 trades in the 100 bonds occur 
over 2,720 days. Classifying the data into bond trading days makes it possible to measure 
the range of trade prices of a bond on a particular trading day and to calculate the 
differential between the lowest and the highest prices on that day. It also allows for 
computing the volatility in trade prices of a bond on a particular day. Thus, the unit of 
analysis is average trade price of a bond on a particular day, and there are 2,720 
observational units over the sample period. Appendix J displays a bloc of the dataset 
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following the descriptions above. It shows estimation data for the first 50 days, out of the 
2,720 trading days.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
Time series regressions utilize data on the same observational unit at multiple 
time periods. The time series analytical frame is suitable for analyzing secondary market 
municipal securities prices – which tend to vary over time – and the trade-specific and 
market-wide determinants of those prices.18 I use the time series regression methodology 
to estimate the impacts of the EMMA intervention on trade price differentials and 
volatility in trade prices in municipal securities secondary markets.  
Equation 4.1 specifies the general form of the time series model. 𝑦𝑡 stands for the 
trade price differential (difference between the lowest price of a customer-buy and the 
highest price of a customer-sell trade in a particular bond) on a given day t. Alternatively, 
𝑦𝑡 stands for volatility in the average daily trade price of a bond. 𝒙 is a vector of 
explanatory variables that captures specific factors relating to the individual bond trade 
(trade frequency and trade size), bond characteristics underlying the trade (issue size, 
term to maturity, and coupon rate), and market factors influencing the trade (market yield 
spread). 𝜷 is the vector of coefficients associated with the explanatory variables (𝜷 =
{𝛽1, 𝛽2, … 𝛽𝑘}) and 𝑒𝑡 is the error term.   
𝑦𝑡 =  𝒙𝜷 +  𝑒𝑡        (4.1) 
                                                          
18 Harris and Piwowar (2006), for example, used time series estimations to analyze average transaction 
costs in municipal securities secondary markets. They generated trade data from a one-year sample 
(November 1999 to October 2000) of U.S. municipal bonds. The data covered 254 trading days and their 
time series analysis accounted for the transaction cost effects of trade-specific (e.g., trade size) and  bond-
related (e.g., term to maturity) factors. 
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Also, Equation 4.1 includes a categorical explanatory variable, EMMA, that takes 
the value 1 for the post-EMMA years (July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014) and 0 for the 
pre-EMMA years (January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2009), after adjusting for a 30-day 
transition period. The coefficient of EMMA measures the effect of new information 
disclosure initiatives on efficiency of municipal securities trade pricing.  
Additionally, I analyze the impacts of regulatory disclosure initiatives among 
different segments of investors by estimating separate regressions of Equation 4.1 for 
institutional and retail investor trades, making sure to exclude the variable measuring 
trade size from the regressions, since that variable defines the thresholds for categorizing 
the full dataset into institutional (trade amount of $100,000 or more) and retail (trade 
amount less than $100,000) investor sub-samples. I then compare the coefficients of the 
EMMA variable from the two sub-sample regressions to determine whether price effects 
of regulatory interventions are the same across retail and institutional investor segments.  
I use another measure to gauge the impact of new information disclosure 
initiatives on trade prices. The measure is based on an econometric procedure that has 
been used in more recent studies in finance (e.g., Lee, Strong, & Zhu, 2014; Hribar, 
Kravet, & Wilson, 2014). To proceed, I generate residuals from an initial regression of 
Equation 4.1, making sure to exclude the policy variable, EMMA, from that regression. 
The residual series represent the difference between observed and predicted values of 
trade prices (the dependent variable) and are the unexplained trade prices in the initial 
regression. These unexplained trade prices also indicate bias in trade pricing and contain 
information about pricing quality in the information environment for municipal securities 
trading.  
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Consequently, I modify Equation 4.1 to include the pricing quality variable. 
Consistent with the treatment of residual variables in the academic literature, I conjecture 
that pricing quality is the extent to which trade-specific, bond-related, market-condition, 
and other factors accurately reflect trade price differentials and volatility in secondary 
market municipal securities trades. I expect the size of the coefficient of the pricing bias 
variable to be decreasing between lower (pre-EMMA) and higher (post-EMMA) 
information disclosure regimes. Thus, I create two sub-samples of trades occurring in the 
pre-EMMA and post-EMMA periods and examine whether pricing bias decreased across 
these low and high information-disclosure regimes.   
Equation 4.2 presents details of the modified model. 𝑋1 is the pricing quality 
variable. I use the logarithm of the residual series to control for outliers in estimation. I 
also examine several properties of the residuals (trend, drift, normality, and 
independence) to ensure robustness of the estimates. {𝑋2, 𝑋3, … 𝑋𝑘} are other explanatory 
variables in the modified trade price equation. {𝛽1, 𝛽2, … 𝛽𝑘} are the coefficients 
associated with each explanatory variable, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term.   
ln (𝑦𝑡) = 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + … 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡     (4.2) 
For both the full sample of municipal security trades and sub-samples of the data, 
I investigate linear and non-linear patterns in the time series models of trade price. I 
analyze patterns using unit root tests, powers of explanatory variables (𝑥1,𝑖
2 ), and time of 
the year effects of trading days (𝐼1,𝑖).
19 Also, I use heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
                                                          
19 Sheppard (2002) discussed the general assumption in the literature that high frequency data on financial 
markets exhibit calendar effects in January and December and noted the suitability of dummy variables in 
capturing those effects. The January effect holds that returns (or trade price differentials, in the context of 
the present study) are higher in January as investors return to the market. On the other hand, the December 
effect assumes that returns (or differentials) are lower in December as investors engage in portfolio 
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errors. Wooldridge (2010) underscored the importance of correcting for 
heteroskedasticity because its presence can invalidate standard errors, t statistics, and F 
statistics, thereby complicating statistical inference.  
Finally, I assess whether the Great Recession significantly altered the relationship 
between regulatory disclosure and price efficiency in municipal securities secondary 
markets. Easley and O’Hara (2010) described how the Great Recession may have 
affected investors and their valuation of municipal securities (with potential effects on 
trade price differentials and volatility). My approach in analyzing the Great Recession 
effects relies on Lee et al. (2014). They accounted for the Great Recession in their study 
of regulatory disclosure and security mispricing in stock markets. Following their lead, I 
exclude municipal securities trades executed during the Great Recession (December 2007 
to June 2009) from the pre-EMMA regime (January 2005 to June 2009) and assess the 
trade price impacts of regulatory disclosure between the pre-EMMA and post EMMA 
(July 2009 to December 2014) periods. I expect to find no significant difference in the 
pricing effects of regulatory disclosure after controlling for the Great Recession.  
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of the sample data. Overall, average daily 
trade prices were higher in the post-regulatory disclosure period (M=108.95, SD=7.36) 
than in the pre-regulatory disclosure period (M=103.57, SD=4.02), possibly reflecting 
investors’ demand for gradually increasing yields as more information on bonds became  
                                                          
rebalancing, mostly due to realized losses. It is not entirely clear whether these propositions fit municipal 
securities trades as they do stock and corporate bond market trades.  
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Table 4.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample of Municipal Securities Trades   
 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Q1 Median Q3 
 
Panel A: Pre-regulatory disclosure regime (January 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009) 
     Trade price 103.57 4.02 100.10 103.55 106.90 
     Trade price differential 1.67 1.28 0.50 1.56 2.56 
     Trade price volatility 0.016 0.013 0.005 0.015 0.025 
     Trade Frequency 12 37 2 4 9 
     Trade size 514,086 2,137,506 37,500 85,000 253,462 
     Issue size ($ million) 128.2 142.3 21.4 68.3 200.0 
     Term to maturity 15 7 9 13 20 
     Coupon rate  5.05 0.46 5.00 5.00 5.25 
     Market yield spread 2.03 1.30 0.72 2.34 3.27 
     Market yield index 72.82 46.48 25.81 83.87 117.20 
     N = 1,115      
 
Panel B: Post-regulatory disclosure regime (July 1, 2009 – December 31, 2014) 
     Trade price 108.95 7.36 102.64 108.68 115.21 
     Trade price differential 1.55 1.16 0.45 1.56 2.39 
     Trade price volatility 0.014 0.011 0.004 0.015 0.022 
     Trade Frequency 9 17 2 4 9 
     Trade size 661,788 1,773,291 39,286 102,500 406,250 
     Issue size ($ million) 108.4 137.7 25.0 58.6 124.8 
     Term to maturity 15 8 8 14 19 
     Coupon rate  4.80 1.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 
     Market yield spread 2.47 0.69 1.90 2.23 3.13 
     Market yield index 88.56 24.89 68.10 79.93 112.19 
     N = 1,605           
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available. Trade price differentials decreased, on average, between the lower information 
(M=1.67, SD=1.28) and higher information (M=1.55, SD=1.16) environments. Similarly, 
average volatility in trade prices decreased between the pre-regulatory disclosure 
(M=0.016, SD=0.013) and post-regulatory disclosure (M=0.014, SD=0.011) periods. 
Altogether, the sample statistics seem to suggest that increased information disclosure is 
associated with more efficient pricing in municipal securities secondary markets. 
It is also remarkable that trade frequency declined, on average, between the pre-
regulatory disclosure (M=12, SD=37) and post-regulatory disclosure (M=9, SD=17) 
regimes. The decline could be evidence of a slowdown in activity, or liquidity, between 
the low and high information environments. However, the trade frequency statistic must 
be considered in the context of trade size effects. On average, trade sizes increased 
between the pre-EMMA (M=514,086, SD=2,137,506) and post-EMMA (M=661,788, 
SD=1,773,291) periods, reflecting more depth of transactions despite the marginal 
decrease in frequency.  
Primary market indicators of trade prices remained largely the same between the 
pre-EMMA and post-EMMA periods but municipal market-wide yield spreads widened 
considerably from the low information (M=2.03, SD=1.30) to high information (M=2.47, 
SD=0.69) regimes. This outcome could be due to several factors. It could be that the 
improved information environment following regulatory disclosure interventions made it 
possible for market agents to more adequately assess risk and uncertainty associated with 
securities trading; therefore, the marginal increase in average yield spreads in the era 
following the interventions served as a correction for mispricing of risk in the low 
information environment. Or it could be that the marginal increase in yield spreads in the 
104 
 
post-regulatory disclosure period (July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014) is a reflection of 
the increased risk environment in the period, given that the period immediately follows 
the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009). 
Overall, the sample statistics give preliminary indications of how regulatory 
disclosure interventions, along with other trade-specific, bond-related, and market 
condition factors, affect efficiency of trade prices. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 illustrate these 
preliminary indications further. The first graph shows a general decline (slope=-0.00007) 
in trade price differentials between 2005 and 2014. In the second and third graphs, trade 
price differentials declined more steeply in the post-EMMA regime (slope=-0.0005) 
compared to the pre-EMMA regime (slope=-0.00006).  I explore these sample statistics 
further in an empirical framework.     
 
4.5.2 Unit Root Tests    
Prior to estimating the trade pricing model, I examine the time series properties of 
the dependent variable and interval-level explanatory variables. Unit root tests provide a 
way to check whether the model variables are stationary for estimation. The Dickey-
Fuller unit root test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) checks whether a variable follows a unit-root 
process. It tests the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root against an 
alternative one that the variable is generated by a stationary process. A variable that is not 
stationary must be differenced d times to become stationary and integrated of order d, 
I(d), before it is used in estimations.  
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Figure 4.1. Average Daily Trade Price Differentials in Municipal Securities Secondary 
Markets. 
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Figure 4.2. Average Daily Trade Price Differentials in the Pre-EMMA Regulatory 
Disclosure Regime. 
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Figure 4.3. Average Daily Trade Price Differentials in the Post-EMMA Regulatory 
Disclosure Regime
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 I use the modified Dickey–Fuller t test proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock 
(1996), which has significantly greater power than previous forms of the test. The 
modified test transforms the time series to a generalized least squares (GLS) regression 
before testing for unit roots, and it accommodates analysis of time trends and different 
lag structures of the variables. Appendix K shows results from the Dickey-Fuller GLS 
unit root tests. Results show that the variables measuring trade price differential (t=-
18.2), trade frequency (t=-19.5), trade size (t=- 28.2), issue size (t=-12.6), term to 
maturity (t=-17.6), and coupon rate (t=-19.4) are all stationary at the 1 percent level. 
Also, the market yield spread variable is (weakly) significant (t=-1.78). Consequently, I 
specify all interval level variables at their levels, I(0), in the trade pricing model.  
 
4.5.3 Prais–Winsten and Cochrane–Orcutt Time Series Regressions 
As noted in Section 4.4, heteroskedasticity can invalidate standard errors, t 
statistics, and F statistics in time series estimations and complicate statistical inference. 
The Prais–Winsten and Cochrane–Orcutt estimation procedure is one of the ways to 
correct for heterosckedasiicty to achieve robust estimation results. The approach fits a 
linear model using a generalized least-squares (GLS) estimator and an autoregressive 
specification for the error term such that the linear model corrects for first-order serially 
correlated residuals. Cochrane–Orcutt (1949), Prais–Winsten (1954), and Hildreth and Lu 
(1960) provide the underlying framework for this estimation procedure, and Becketti 
(2013) offers additional insights. I use the Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orchutt time 
series estimation procedure to investigate the impacts of regulatory disclosure 
interventions on trade pricing in municipal securities secondary markets. I examine 
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efficiency effects on trade pricing using models of trade price differentials and trade price 
volatility for the full sample of municipal securities trades as well as sub-samples that 
group transactions into institutional and retail trades.  
 
4.5.3.1 Trade Price Effects of Regulatory Interventions: Full Sample Estimates 
Table 4.2 presents results for the determinants of trade price differential and trade 
price volatility for the entire sample of municipal securities trades. The F-statistics in the 
trade price differential model (F=76.20) and trade price volatility model (F=89.48) show 
that the dependent variable in each model is significantly related to at least one of the 
independent variables in the population. The R2 statistics show that the regression model 
of trade price differential explains at least 16.4 percent of the variation in price 
differentials, while the trade price volatility model explains at least 18.8 percent of the 
variation in price volatility.20 
Results confirm the hypothesis that the latest information disclosure initiatives 
under MSRB’s EMMA regime are associated with a significant improvement in the 
efficiency of municipal securities trade prices. The coefficient of the variable measuring 
regulatory disclosure interventions is significant at the 1 percent level in the trade price 
differential model (t=-3.61) as well as the trade price volatility model (t=-5.49). The 
results show that the EMMA regulatory intervention is associated with a reduction in 
daily trade price differentials by a margin of $0.18, on average. Similarly, 
                                                          
20 These R2 statistics (R2=16.4% and R2=18.8%) are substantial considering that the present study estimates 
high frequency data on daily trades of financial assets. Other studies on municipal securities secondary 
market pricing find similar model performance outcomes. For example, Downing and Zhang (2004) 
reported R2 statistics ranging from 10.5% to 15.1% for their time series estimation of weekly trade price 
range models, while the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (2014b) showed R2 statistics ranging from 
5.3% to 7.5% for different ordinary least squares regression models of daily paired-trade price differentials.           
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Table 4.2 
 
Full Sample Estimates of the Determinants of Trade Price Efficiency  
 
  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variable Trade Price Differential Trade Price Volatility 
 
 
 
 
   
Policy Intervention   
   
       EMMA  -0.178*** -0.00260*** 
 (0.0494) (0.000474) 
Trade-specific variables   
   
       Trade frequency  0.00596*** 0.000061*** 
 (0.000792) (0.00000757) 
   
       Trade size -0.0800*** -0.000735*** 
 (0.0113) (0.000108) 
Bond-related variables   
   
       Issue size ($ million) 0.00106*** 0.0000101*** 
 (0.000184) (0.00000176) 
   
       Term to maturity 0.0445*** 0.000475*** 
 (0.00326) (0.0000312) 
   
       Coupon rate  -0.169*** -0.00217*** 
 (0.0308) (0.000294) 
Market condition variable   
   
       Market yield spread 0.184*** 0.00205*** 
 (0.0275) (0.000264) 
   
Constant Term 1.295*** 0.0141*** 
 (0.142) (0.00135) 
   
Observations 2,719 2,719 
F (7, 2711) 76.20 89.48 
Prob > F        0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.164 0.188 
rho 0.067 0.074 
Durbin-Watson (original) 1.868 1.855 
Durbin-Watson (transformed) 2.012 2.013 
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volatility in trade prices declined, on average, following the EMMA regulatory disclosure 
initiatives. Volatility in average daily prices declined by a margin of 0.26 percent, on 
average, following the disclosure interventions.  
Each of the other explanatory variables in the models of trade price differential 
and trade price volatility is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and, apart from 
the variable measuring coupon rate effects, all variables confirm the hypotheses linking 
them to trade pricing efficiency. Trade frequency is positively associated with 
differentials and volatility of secondary market trade prices. As number of trades 
increases, average daily trade price differentials widen by $0.01 and average daily 
volatility in prices increases by 0.01 percent. This result confirms the hypothesis that an 
increase in the number of trades in a security, ceteris paribus, raises the number of 
different price quotes for the security, widens the range of prices for the security, and 
increases both price differentials and volatility.  
Effects of trade size on efficient pricing are larger than the price effect of trade 
frequency. As trade size increases, average daily trade price differentials decrease by 
$0.08 and average daily trade price volatility decreases by 0.08 percent. This finding 
provides support for the hypothesis that smaller trade sizes create a noisy trade pricing 
environment, which widens the range of daily prices and increases volatility in prices.   
Bond related factors showed considerable differences in their impacts on trade 
pricing, either showing very minimal impact, relatively large effect, or a direction of 
impact that is contrary to the expected relationship. As issue size increases, both average 
daily trade price differentials ($0.001) and volatility in average daily trade price (0.001 
percent) remain flat. On the other hand, an increase in term to maturity raises both 
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average daily trade price differential ($0.04) and volatility in average daily trade prices 
(0.05 percent) by considerably larger margins compared to the effects of issue size. 
Nonetheless, the results for both issue size and term to maturity confirm stated 
hypotheses: investors prefer to trade in large-size issues (because retail investors tend to 
flock to large-size issues) and longer term issues (because longer-term issues tend to have 
enhanced features), and the increased demand for these issues widens price differentials 
and raises price volatility.  
As for coupon rate effects, the results show an unexpected negative association 
with trade price differentials and trade price volatility. An increase in coupon rate 
considerably narrows both average daily trade price differentials ($0.17) and volatility in 
average daily trade prices (0.22 percent). This result is contrary to the stated hypothesis 
that investors tend to demand higher yields or coupons to compensate for higher interest 
rate risk and price volatility or differentials; nevertheless, it may be that higher coupons 
also serve as inducements for investors to hold on to bonds rather than trade them, 
causing declines in price differentials and volatility – the preponderance of evidence on 
buy and hold investors in municipal securities secondary markets seems to support this 
assertion. Overall, the results for bond-related factors show that maturity structure and 
yield considerations tend to weigh more heavily, than size of debt issue, in secondary 
market trade pricing.  
Market yield spreads have relatively large impacts on trade price efficiency. An 
increase in the municipal market-wide yield spread widens average daily trade price 
differentials by $0.18 and increases volatility in average daily trade prices by 0.21 
percent. This finding confirms the hypothesis that widening spreads indicate increasing 
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tensions and uncertainties in the municipal securities market and tend to raise price 
differentials and volatility.  
Further, I estimate the impacts of regulatory disclosure using a latent measure of 
pricing bias across high and low information regimes. I assess impacts using the full 
sample of municipal securities trades. As noted earlier, the measure of pricing bias 
derives from the residuals of an initial regression of trade prices that excludes the variable 
measuring regulatory interventions. The residuals represent unexplained trade prices and 
contain latent information about pricing quality or bias. Results in Table 4.3 confirm the 
expectation that the latest information disclosure initiatives are associated with a 
significant reduction in the effect of pricing bias on trade prices. An increase in pricing 
bias raised trade price differentials by 1.46 percentage points (t=2.54) in the pre-EMMA 
period. However, in the post-EMMA period, the effect of pricing bias on trade prices 
decreased from 1.46 to 1.22 percentage points (t=3.75).  
Finally, I estimate time series regressions to examine whether the Great Recession 
significantly altered the relationship between regulatory disclosure initiatives and price 
efficiency in municipal securities secondary markets. As stated earlier, I exclude trades 
that were executed during the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009) from the 
pre-EMMA period (January 2005 to June 2009) and estimate the trade price efficiency 
model separately for the recession-adjusted pre-EMMA period and the post-EMMA 
period. After controlling for the Great Recession period, the estimation results show no 
significant difference in the effects of regulatory disclosure on trade price efficiency in 
both the trade price differential and trade price volatility models. 
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Table 4.3 
 
Full Sample Estimates of the Effect of Pricing Bias on Trade Price Differentials   
 
Variable Trade Price Differential 
 Pre-EMMA Post-EMMA 
   
   
Pricing Bias (logarithm) 1.4649** 1.2181*** 
 (0.5775) (0.3250) 
   
Other Characteristics     
   
       Trade frequency 0.0020 0.0037* 
 (0.0015) (0.0022) 
   
       Trade size -0.0367 0.0230 
 (0.0385) (0.0407) 
   
       Issue size ($ million) 0.0003 0.0007** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) 
   
       Term to maturity 0.0044 0.0105 
 (0.0203) (0.0092) 
   
       Coupon rate 0.0363 -0.0330 
 (0.1673) (0.0409) 
   
       Market yield spread -0.0439 0.0158 
 (0.1165) (0.0578) 
   
Constant Term 0.7814 0.9139*** 
 (0.6423) (0.1516) 
   
Observations 1,108 1,596 
F  34.52 49.92 
Prob > F        0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.180 0.180 
rho       0.068       0.049 
Durbin-Watson (original) 1.862 1.904 
Durbin-Watson (transformed) 2.005 1.998 
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.5.3.2 Trade Price Effects of Regulatory Interventions: Sub-sample Estimates  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present sub-sample estimates of trade price differentials and 
trade price volatility for institutional and retail investor segments of the secondary 
market. The F and R2 statistics in each of the four models show that the dependent 
variable is significantly related to at least one of the independent variables in the 
population, and the regression models explain a considerable amount (between 15.5 and 
22.6 percent) of the variation in trade price differentials and trade price volatility.  
Results do not provide sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
EMMA regulatory disclosure interventions reduced trade pricing distortions institutional 
investors face by the same margin it lowered retail investors’ trade price distortions. 
Table 4.4 shows that regulatory disclosure initiatives are associated with a statistically 
significant (t=-3.90) decrease in average daily trade price differentials for institutional 
investors, by a margin of $0.28 on average, but the effect of interventions among retail 
investors is not clear as the results show an insignificant statistical relationship (t=-1.70).  
Trade price volatility results in Table 4.5 present a much clearer picture of the 
different impacts of regulatory disclosure on institutional and retail investors. Results 
show that disclosure interventions are associated with a statistically significant decrease 
in average daily trade price volatility among institutional (t=-5.21) and retail (t=-2.38) 
investors but volatility declined by a larger margin (0.20 percent) in the institutional 
investor segment compared to the retail investor segment. These findings confirm 
evidence on the inequities in trade pricing that tend to favor large investors over small 
investors in municipal securities secondary markets.  
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Table 4.4 
 
Estimates of the Determinants of Trade Price Differentials in Institutional and Retail 
Investor Sub-samples of Municipal Securities Trades 
 
Variable                            Trade Price Differential 
 
 
 
Institutional Trades 
 
Retail Trades 
 
Difference 
    
Policy Intervention    
    
       EMMA -0.279*** -0.0759 n/a 
 (0.0716) (0.0713)  
       Trade-specific variable    
    
       Trade Frequency 0.00435*** 0.0391*** -0.0348 
 (0.000799) (0.00373)  
Bond-related variables    
    
       Issue Size 0.00143*** 0.000290 n/a 
 (0.000239) (0.000301)  
       Term to maturity 0.0461*** 0.0404*** 0.0057 
 (0.00464) (0.00507)  
       Coupon rate -0.289*** -0.0237 n/a 
 (0.0397) (0.0520)  
Market condition variable    
    
       Market yield spread 0.274*** 0.127*** 0.1470 
 (0.0379) (0.0403)  
    
Constant Term 1.637*** 0.589**  
 (0.179) (0.263)  
    
Observations 1,373 1,345  
F  56.62 41.57  
Prob > F        0.000 0.000  
R-squared 0.199 0.157  
rho 0.113 0.061  
Durbin-Watson (original) 1.779 1.879  
Durbin-Watson (transformed) 2.016 2.007  
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5 
 
Estimates of the Determinants of Trade Price Volatility in Institutional and Retail 
Investor Sub-samples of Municipal Securities Trades 
 
Variable Trade Price Volatility 
    
 Institutional Trades Retail Trades Difference 
    
Policy Intervention    
    
       EMMA -0.00358*** -0.00162** 0.00196 
 (0.000687) (0.000683)  
Trade-specific variable    
    
       Trade frequency 0.0000449*** 0.000391*** -0.000346 
 (0.0000076) (0.0000356)  
Bond-related variables    
    
       Issue Size 0.0000134*** 0.00000303 n/a 
 (0.00000227) (0.00000287)  
    
       Term to maturity 0.000488*** 0.000430*** 0.000058 
 (0.0000443) (0.0000484)  
    
       Coupon rate -0.00327*** -0.000843* 0.002427 
 (0.000379) (0.000497)  
Market condition variable    
    
       Market yield spread 0.00296*** 0.00144*** 0.00152 
 (0.000363) (0.000386)  
    
Constant 0.0171*** 0.00775***  
 (0.00171) (0.00251)  
    
Observations 1,373 1,345  
F  66.32 49.34  
Prob > F        0.000 0.000  
R-squared 0.226 0.181  
rho       0.124       0.068  
Durbin-Watson (original) 1.759 1.866  
Durbin-Watson (transformed) 2.020 2.008  
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Price efficiency effects of trade-specific and market condition variables also differ 
considerably between institutional and retail investor segments of the secondary market. 
Trade frequency has a larger impact on price differentials and volatility among retail 
investors than institutional investors. An increase in the number of trades is associated 
with $0.03 more increase in average daily trade price differentials and 0.03 percent more 
volatility in average daily trade prices of retail investors compared to institutional 
investors. This result highlights how frequent trading in small sizes widens differentials 
and raises volatility to an extent that exceeds what will occur if markets have more depth 
and stability from larger-size trades sequenced more evenly over time.   
Also, market yield spread effects are larger among institutional investors than 
retail investors. An increase in the yield spread is associated with $0.15 more increase in 
average daily trade price differentials and 0.15 percent more increase in trade price 
volatility for retail investors compared to institutional investors. This finding seems to 
suggest that institutional investors tend to be more risk averse about market-wide changes 
in risk and uncertainty than retail investors, especially given that institutional investors 
risk losing larger amounts in worsening market conditions than retail investors. 
 
4.6 Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Directions for Future Research 
Over the years, regulatory policy in municipal securities markets has focused on 
promoting increased information disclosure and transparency to enhance market 
efficiency. Efficient markets theory predicts that public dissemination of information on 
municipal securities trades will reduce search and transaction costs for investors and 
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lower price distortions. This study analyzed the latest regulatory disclosure initiatives in 
municipal securities markets. The initiatives spanned March 31 2008 and June 1, 2009.  
Robust time series estimations show that regulatory interventions enhanced the 
efficiency of trade pricing in municipal securities secondary markets as average daily 
price differentials and volatility both declined market-wide. However, the empirical 
estimates do not provide sufficient information to support the efficient markets 
hypothesis that public dissemination of information on executed trades will reduce 
information flow disparities among market segments and counteract dealer rent-seeking 
behaviors that generate price distortions. Findings show that institutional investors 
continue to have a pricing advantage over retail investors in municipal securities trade 
pricing.  
These findings weigh into policy discussions on the merits and demerits of market 
regulation. Supporters of regulatory policy argue that tighter regulatory framework are 
needed to correct the welfare costs of price distortions in the market system while 
skeptics have pointed to how regulatory rules constrain competition in the private sector 
and limit the processes that enhance economic growth (Vocino, 2003). The present study 
provides evidence that interventions in municipal bond markets improve efficiency of 
securities pricing market-wide. This should give renewed impetus to regulatory efforts 
aimed at further enhancing municipal bond market efficiency.   
Also, the finding that efficiency effects of regulatory interventions were larger for 
institutional investors than retail investors shows that policies governing municipal 
securities trading and pricing must respond more effectively to counteract disparities in 
information flow and rent-seeking behavior, which creates unequal opportunities for the 
120 
 
retail investor segment of the market. One way is to identify spaces within dynamic 
market environments that are most attractive to retail investor trades and target protective 
regulatory schemes at these fronts. For example, new insights on specific sectors, features 
of securities, and dealer characteristics that retail investors tend to flock to as markets 
evolve can inform the types of soft enabling rules and incentives that regulators direct to 
specific market spaces to reduce the risks surrounding retail investor portfolios and 
minimize the margin of rent-seeking by securities dealers.  
Overall, regulatory policy in municipal bond market contexts must stretch beyond 
interventions and enforcement of disclosure rules to emphasize, to a greater extent, other 
supportive mechanisms such as investor education. Current efforts by the SEC and 
MSRB at investor education are commendable but must be deepened. In today’s 
increasingly complex markets where trading in sophisticated debt instruments proliferate, 
most small investors are not fully aware of the mechanics of their trading portfolios and 
risks therein. Increased educational interactions with the investor community using new 
(social) media technologies to achieve wider reach and more speedy responses to investor 
questions and concerns will complement, more extensively, current achievements of 
regulatory disclosure initiatives. 
This study is limited in the extent to which it portrays trading dynamics in U.S. 
municipal securities markets as a whole. Data for the empirical analysis is from a random 
stratified sample of California state-issued general obligation bonds. While California is 
the leading source of municipal securities trades among U.S. states, generalizability of 
the findings is constrained to the extent that the data does not cover school districts, 
cities, counties, and other states, as well as other types of securities (e.g., revenue bonds). 
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Still, the present study extends existing knowledge in that it analyzes the latest regulatory 
interventions in municipal securities secondary markets, considers the influence of 
market-wide conditions, and presents stronger evidence on how the pricing advantage of 
institutional investors over retail investors has persisted even under improved 
informational environments.  
Future studies should consider how existing rules and regulations in municipal 
securities secondary markets interact to achieve intended regulatory policy goals. 
Preliminary work in this area point to how the Dodd-Frank Act proposed about 200 new 
rules (Coates, 2015) and how rule changes proposed in the Act have generated 
uncertainty about regulatory policy among market agents (Nodari, 2014). Thus, it would 
be useful to investigate whether a threshold exists beyond which an existing set of 
regulatory rules and their enforcement can generate sub-optimal regulatory policy 
outcomes.   
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Appendix A 
 
Multicollinearity Diagnostics for Models of True Interest Costs 
 
 
1. Variance Inflation Factors in the Basic Model 
         Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
     -------------+---------------------- 
            y2013 |     12.93    0.077369 
        ratinglmh |     10.92    0.091591 
            y2012 |     10.62    0.094187 
            y2009 |      8.25    0.121238 
            y2014 |      7.90    0.126595 
            y2010 |      5.68    0.176094 
            y2008 |      5.12    0.195388 
            y2011 |      5.10    0.196258 
            y2007 |      3.08    0.325185 
       negotiated |      2.18    0.459341 
         bbsdevma |      1.79    0.558688 
            y2006 |      1.76    0.568070 
           repeat |      1.56    0.639989 
            ttmat |      1.46    0.686882 
           isizeM |      1.08    0.924648 
     -------------+---------------------- 
         Mean VIF |      5.29 
 
2. Variance Inflation Factors in the Curvilinear Regression 
 
         Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
     -------------+---------------------- 
            y2013 |     13.17    0.075949 
         repeatsq |     12.73    0.078580 
           repeat |     11.23    0.089045 
        ratinglmh |     10.92    0.091590 
            y2012 |     10.62    0.094150 
            y2009 |      8.30    0.120549 
            y2014 |      7.90    0.126521 
            y2010 |      5.68    0.175918 
            y2011 |      5.14    0.194733 
            y2008 |      5.12    0.195287 
            y2007 |      3.10    0.322529 
       negotiated |      2.18    0.459211 
         bbsdevma |      1.97    0.506789 
            y2006 |      1.77    0.564845 
            ttmat |      1.46    0.686772 
           isizeM |      1.08    0.923782 
     -------------+---------------------- 
         Mean VIF |      6.40 
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Appendix B 
 
Residual Diagnostics for Basic Model of True Interest Costs 
 
 
 
 
Standardized normal probability (P-P) plot 
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Appendix C 
 
Residual Diagnostics for Curvilinear Model of True Interest Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized normal probability (P-P) plot 
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Appendix D 
 
Basic Model of True Interest Costs: Full Estimation Output 
 
  
Variable True Interest Costs 
 
  
Network Stability 0.00109*** 
 (0.000410) 
Issuance Size (million dollars) 0.000167 
 (0.000105) 
Term to maturity (years) 0.0420*** 
 (0.00516) 
Credit rating of issue -0.156*** 
 (0.0566) 
Issuance method (negotiated=1) 0.291*** 
 (0.0528) 
Market yield spread 0.242*** 
 (0.0368) 
Year: 2006 0.0467 
 (0.0396) 
Year: 2007 -0.253*** 
 (0.0539) 
Year: 2008 -0.394** 
 (0.157) 
Year: 2009 0.219 
 (0.155) 
Year: 2010 0.479*** 
 (0.171) 
Year: 2011 -0.546*** 
 (0.141) 
Year: 2012 -0.912*** 
 (0.125) 
Year: 2013 -0.987*** 
 (0.130) 
Year: 2014 -1.324*** 
 (0.132) 
Constant 3.468*** 
 (0.229) 
  
Observations 1,063 
R-squared 0.703 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E 
 
Curvilinear Model of True Interest Costs: Full Estimation Output 
 
  
Variable True Interest Costs 
 
  
Network Stability 0.00290*** 
 (0.00108) 
Network Stability (squared term) -0.00001* 
 (0.000006) 
Issuance Size (million dollars) 0.00017 
 (0.000105) 
Term to maturity (years) 0.0419*** 
 (0.00516) 
Credit rating of issue -0.156*** 
 (0.0576) 
Issuance method (negotiated=1) 0.292*** 
 (0.0527) 
Market yield spread 0.256*** 
 (0.0398) 
Year: 2006 0.0578 
 (0.0415) 
Year: 2007 -0.240*** 
 (0.0531) 
Year: 2008 -0.388** 
 (0.158) 
Year: 2009 0.200 
 (0.158) 
Year: 2010 0.471*** 
 (0.171) 
Year: 2011 -0.523*** 
 (0.143) 
Year: 2012 -0.907*** 
 (0.127) 
Year: 2013 -0.953*** 
 (0.132) 
Year: 2014 -1.318*** 
 (0.133) 
Constant 3.401*** 
 (0.241) 
Observations 1,063 
R-squared 0.704 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix F 
 
School District Advance Refunding Transactions in U.S. States  
 
 
State Number of Transactions Percent of Total 
Texas 4168 28.1 
California 1352 9.1 
Pennsylvania 1190 8.0 
Illinois 1157 7.8 
Ohio 899 6.1 
New Jersey 660 4.5 
Wisconsin 561 3.8 
Missouri  551 3.7 
Washington 540 3.6 
Colorado 420 2.8 
Kansas 408 2.8 
Michigan 356 2.4 
Iowa 295 2.0 
Minnesota 250 1.7 
Oregon 243 1.6 
Louisiana 215 1.5 
Utah 194 1.3 
South Carolina 188 1.3 
Idaho 171 1.2 
Alabama 125 0.8 
Georgia 110 0.7 
Connecticut 95 0.6 
Arkansas 81 0.5 
Nebraska 81 0.5 
Mississippi 76 0.5 
Nevada 75 0.5 
Arizona 64 0.4 
South Dakota 64 0.4 
Montana 51 0.3 
New Mexico 40 0.3 
Tennessee 35 0.2 
North Carolina 27 0.2 
New York 24 0.2 
Massachusetts 19 0.1 
Maryland 19 0.1 
North Dakota 14 0.1 
Indiana 7 0.0 
 14,825 100.0 
 
Note. Compiled using data from Bloomberg LLP. (2015). Data starts from 2005 to 2014. 
 
128 
 
Appendix G 
 
MATLAB Codes for Monte Carlo Option Valuation 
 
 
%%% Option Parameters (Replace xxx with Parameter Values): 
 
s = xxx;     [Value of the advance refunded bond]    
 
k = xxx;     [Exercise price of the advance refunded bond] 
 
r = xxx;     [Risk-free interest rate] 
 
sigma = xxx;     [Volatility in trade price of advance refunded bond] 
 
t = xxx;     [Time remaining until call date]  
 
 
%%% Monte Carlo Method Parameters: 
 
% randn('state',0)    [ Repeatable trials on/off]  
 
M = 1e7;     [100,000 Monte Carlo trials] 
 
 
%%% Computation of Option Value Loss  
 
final_vals=s*exp((r-0.5*sigma^2)*t + sigma*sqrt(t)*randn(M,1)); 
 
option_values=max(k-final_vals,0);    [Evaluate the Put option] 
 
present_vals=exp(-r*t)*option_values;   [Discount under r-n assumption] 
 
int=1.96*std(present_vals)/sqrt(M);    [Compute confidence intervals] 
 
put_value=mean(present_vals);   [Take average] 
 
display(put_value) 
 
display([put_value-int put_value+int]) 
 
 
%%%% END %%%% 
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Appendix H 
 
Histogram of the Distribution of School Districts’ Option Value Loss  
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Appendix I 
 
Milestones in Municipal Securities Regulation and Information Disclosure 
 
 
1975 – Creation of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
 
1976 – MSRB Established Uniform Practice Rules 
 
1978 − MSRB Created Rules on Underwriting Practices, Fair Practice, and Yield Comparisons 
 
1979 – MSRB Required Use of CUSIP Numbers 
 
1980 – MSRB Released Report on Pricing 
 
1982 – Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act Enacted 
 
1984 – Automated Clearance and Settlement Systems 
 
1989 – SEC Adopted SEC Rule 15c2-12 
The SEC mandated that underwriters for most bond issues obtain the issuer’s agreement to 
deliver an official statement to the underwriter within seven business days after the date of sale. 
The SEC also required underwriters to review the official statement to determine whether all key 
factors had been disclosed. The landmark rule promoted increased disclosure and transparency in 
the municipal securities market. 
 
1990 – MSRB Required Filings of Disclosure Documents 
 
1993/94 – Groundbreaking Pay-to-Play Rule G-37 Adopted  
 
1995 – MSRB Created Transaction Reporting System 
The MSRB developed a daily summary report of bonds traded between dealers, a first step in 
providing comprehensive price transparency in the municipal securities market. 
 
1996 – MSRB Adopted Rule on Use of Outside Consultants 
 
1998 – MSRB Published Daily Trade Reports 
The MSRB implemented another major step in providing market transparency, expanding its 
daily reports on dealer trading to include transactions with customers. 
 
2000/2001 – MSRB Adopted Rules on 529 Plans and Other Municipal Fund Securities 
 
2001 – The MSRB Launched the Muni Council 
 
2002 – Electronic Official Statement Submission System is Launched 
 
2005 – MSRB Revised Rule G-38 to Ban Use of Consultants 
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2005 – MSRB Made Comprehensive Real-Time Trade Reports Available 
Dealers were required to submit transaction information to the MSRB within 15 minutes of 
execution of all trades, providing real time public access to their fund information. 
 
2005/2006 - MSRB Established 529 Plan Disclosure and Advertising Standards 
In a series of regulatory actions, the MSRB adopted rules for disclosure and advertising of 529 
plans that ensure fair and complete disclosure in the 529 plan market, consistent with mutual fund 
standards. 
 
2006 - MSRB Launched Regulatory Effort to Establish All-Electronic Disclosure System for 
Municipal Securities  
The MSRB published a concept release setting forth its vision of a centralized electronic 
disclosure system for the municipal securities market. 
 
2008 – MSRB Launched the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) Website 
The launch of the pilot program for the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) website 
was the first time that historical data and statistics on the municipal securities market were 
available from a single source, free of charge. EMMA is an electronic, Internet-based system that 
provides public access to disclosure documents, real-time trade price data and educational 
resources for the municipal securities market. 
 
2009 – MSRB Launched Market Statistics on EMMA 
The MSRB introduced market-wide municipal bond statistics on EMMA that allowed investors to 
view municipal market trading trends. The addition of daily statistics on EMMA was the first in a 
series of initiatives by the MSRB to provide investors with more extensive data on municipal 
bonds to help them better understand the market. 
 
2009 – MSRB Provided Auction Rate Security and Variable Rate Demand Obligation 
Transparency 
The MSRB launched a program to collect information about auction rate securities and variable 
rate demand obligations from broker-dealers and disseminate it to the public for free through 
EMMA. Dealers were required to provide the MSRB with interest rates set for auction rate 
securities and variable rate demand obligations. The program provided all market participants 
with additional critical information necessary to trade these financial products. 
 
2009 – MSRB Implemented All-Electronic Official Statement Dissemination Standard 
The MSRB revised its Rule G-32 to require municipal securities underwriters to submit electronic 
copies of official statements and advance refunding documents (rather than paper copies) to 
EMMA. Electronic documents made the submission process less costly and speeds dissemination 
to investors. 
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2009 – MSRB Began Collecting and Posting Continuing Disclosures 
Under amendments to SEC Rule 15c2-12 adopted by the SEC in 2008, municipal bond issuers 
began to provide electronic copies of continuing disclosure documents to the MSRB through 
EMMA, which made them immediately available to the public. The MSRB officially began to 
collect all disclosure documents associated with municipal bonds under a combination of MSRB 
and SEC rules. 
 
2010 – MSRB Revised Rule G-37 to Require Additional Political Contributions Disclosure 
The MSRB revised its Rule G-37 to require disclosure of dealer contributions to municipal bond 
ballot campaigns. 
Congress Expands MSRB's Mission and Jurisdiction 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed by President Barack 
Obama on July 21, 2010, expanded the MSRB's mission to include the protection of municipal 
entities and obligated persons. It also granted the MSRB rulemaking authority over municipal 
advisors. The MSRB's expanded mandate and mission became effective October 1, 2010. 
 
2012 – MSRB Expands Obligations of Underwriters to their State and Local Government Clients 
The MSRB issued an interpretive notice to its Rule G-17 on fair dealing to outline explicit and 
expanded requirements for underwriters aimed at protecting state and local governments that 
issue municipal bonds. 
 
 
Note. Compiled using information from the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board. See 
www.msrb.com 
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Appendix J 
 
Data for Estimating the Trade Price Impacts of Regulatory Disclosure Interventions in Municipal Securities Secondary Markets 
 
Trade  
Day 
 
 
Trade 
Price 
Trade Price 
Differential 
Trade Price 
Volatility 
Trade 
Frequency 
Trade 
Size 
CUSIP  Issue Size 
($ million) 
Term to 
Maturity 
Coupon 
Rate 
Market 
Yield 
Spread 
4/13/2005   99.69 0.625 0.0063 2 100000 13062RHW  0.43 11.7 4.65 1.61 
6/17/2005   98.85 2.560 0.0259 18 384444 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 1.1 
6/20/2005   106.65 0.978 0.0092 3 8923333 13062RLZ  13.39 19.0 5 1.09 
6/21/2005   99.73 3.012 0.0302 18 46111 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 1.04 
6/22/2005   99.62 2.441 0.0245 18 37500 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.92 
6/23/2005   99.64 3.175 0.0319 16 153125 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.89 
6/28/2005   99.73 3.036 0.0304 16 103750 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.83 
6/29/2005   100.80 1.965 0.0195 4 25000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.86 
6/30/2005   99.87 2.125 0.0213 6 77500 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.81 
7/1/2005   99.67 1.000 0.0100 3 30000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.89 
7/5/2005   99.96 2.250 0.0225 12 25417 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.89 
7/6/2005   99.61 3.780 0.0379 20 202000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.89 
7/7/2005   100.12 2.242 0.0224 12 30417 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.9 
7/8/2005   100.00 0.000 0.0000 3 41667 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.94 
7/11/2005   99.92 2.511 0.0251 14 42857 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.92 
7/12/2005   99.85 2.241 0.0224 11 42273 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.94 
7/13/2005   100.03 2.967 0.0297 11 58636 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.95 
7/14/2005   100.04 3.183 0.0318 9 77222 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.96 
7/15/2005   98.96 2.625 0.0265 9 484444 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.92 
7/18/2005   99.57 1.956 0.0196 5 193000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.92 
7/19/2005   99.98 2.119 0.0212 8 38750 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.89 
7/20/2005   99.95 2.250 0.0225 11 26364 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.87 
7/21/2005   99.79 1.250 0.0125 9 16667 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.93 
7/22/2005   99.49 1.750 0.0176 10 27000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.85 
7/26/2005   99.95 1.000 0.0100 7 33571 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.81 
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Trade 
Day 
Trade 
Price 
Trade Price 
Differential 
Trade Price 
Volatility 
Trade 
Frequency 
Trade 
Size 
CUSIP  Issue Size  
($ million) 
Term to 
Maturity 
Coupon 
Rate 
Market 
Yield 
Spread 
7/27/2005   99.11 2.915 0.0294 18 105833 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.87 
7/28/2005   99.19 2.325 0.0234 9 118889 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.79 
7/29/2005   98.66 1.586 0.0161 4 8750 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.86 
8/1/2005   98.88 3.108 0.0314 5 25000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.84 
8/2/2005   99.85 0.750 0.0075 5 24000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.85 
8/3/2005   99.50 2.250 0.0226 12 26250 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.84 
8/4/2005   98.95 2.500 0.0253 9 28333 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.85 
8/5/2005   98.92 2.250 0.0227 8 58750 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.88 
8/8/2005   98.60 1.500 0.0152 5 20000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.88 
8/10/2005   98.63 2.203 0.0223 3 26667 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.89 
8/11/2005   96.93 0.337 0.0035 3 170000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.81 
8/12/2005   102.46 0.000 0.0000 3 18333 13062RKX  12.59 20.0 4.5 0.72 
8/15/2005   98.77 3.070 0.0311 6 47500 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.73 
8/16/2005   96.88 1.250 0.0129 2 100000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.69 
8/23/2005   103.43 0.500 0.0048 2 45000 13062RKX  12.59 20.0 4.5 0.67 
8/25/2005   98.27 3.250 0.0331 5 19000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.64 
8/31/2005   98.12 2.140 0.0218 3 100000 13062RME  12.87 24.0 4.375 0.5 
9/9/2005   106.81 0.015 0.0001 5 10000000 13062RRW  67.27 16.9 5 0.65 
9/12/2005  99.30 2.212 0.0223 52 147212 13062RQY  27.04 23.9 4.375 0.67 
9/13/2005   99.66 3.491 0.0350 45 64111 13062RQY  27.04 23.9 4.375 0.67 
9/14/2005   107.21 0.950 0.0089 2 13250000 13062RRW  67.27 16.9 5 0.75 
9/15/2005   99.63 3.331 0.0334 25 153000 13062RQY  27.04 23.9 4.375 0.77 
9/16/2005   99.45 3.805 0.0383 25 55400 13062RQY  27.04 23.9 4.375 0.76 
9/19/2005   99.24 3.000 0.0302 35 33429 13062RQY  27.04 23.9 4.375 0.67 
Note. Compiled using data from the MSRB, Bloomberg LLP and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Appendix K 
 
Unit Root Test Results for Variables in the Municipal Securities Trade Pricing Model 
 
 
 
(1) Trade Price differential 
 
. dfgls adtpxdiff, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for adtpxdiff                                     Number of obs =  
2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2           -13.236           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1           -18.168           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  2 with RMSE   1.21891 
Min SC   =  .4046445 at lag  2 with RMSE   1.21891 
Min MAIC =  .5926693 at lag  2 with RMSE   1.21891 
 
 
(2) Trade Frequency 
 
. dfgls dttfreq, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for dttfreq                                       Number of obs =  
2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2           -18.253           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1           -19.523           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  1 with RMSE   24.4163 
Min SC   =  6.396323 at lag  1 with RMSE   24.4163 
Min MAIC =   6.79476 at lag  2 with RMSE  24.41628 
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(3) Trade Size 
 
. dfgls  adtsize, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for adtsize                                       Number of obs =  
2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2           -22.239           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1           -28.211           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  2 with RMSE   1917506 
Min SC   =   28.9418 at lag  2 with RMSE   1917506 
Min MAIC =  29.76917 at lag  2 with RMSE   1917506 
 
 
(4) Issue Size 
 
. dfgls matsize, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for matsize                                       Number of obs =  
2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2            -8.396           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1           -12.600           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) = 0 [use maxlag(0)] 
Min SC   =  37.04406 at lag  2 with RMSE  1.10e+08 
Min MAIC =   37.1029 at lag  2 with RMSE  1.10e+08 
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(5) Coupon rate 
 
. dfgls coupon, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for coupon                                        Number of obs =  
2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2           -13.294           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1           -19.428           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  2 with RMSE  .7073662 
Min SC   = -.6836826 at lag  2 with RMSE  .7073662 
Min MAIC = -.4794922 at lag  2 with RMSE  .7073662 
 
 
(6) Term to maturity 
 
. dfgls  yrtmat, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for yrtmat                                        Number of obs =  
2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2           -11.392           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1           -17.555           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  2 with RMSE  6.079778 
Min SC   =  3.618667 at lag  2 with RMSE  6.079778 
Min MAIC =  3.757249 at lag  2 with RMSE  6.079778 
 
 
. dfgls ycvalue, maxlag(2) notrend 
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(7) Market Yield Spread  
 
DF-GLS for ycvalue                                    Number of obs =  2717 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2            -1.600           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1            -1.775           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  2 with RMSE  .0835166 
Min SC   =  -4.95669 at lag  2 with RMSE  .0835166 
Min MAIC = -4.962057 at lag  2 with RMSE  .0835166 
 
 
. dfgls D.ycvalue, maxlag(2) notrend 
  
DF-GLS for D.ycvalue                                  Number of obs =  2716 
  
               DF-GLS mu       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
  [lags]     Test Statistic        Value             Value             
Value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
    2            -2.558           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
    1            -3.785           -2.580            -1.954            -
1.631 
  
Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) =  2 with RMSE  .0991568 
Min SC   = -4.613372 at lag  2 with RMSE  .0991568 
Min MAIC = -4.615713 at lag  2 with RMSE  .0991568 
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